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Pollution and Economic Activity* 
 
Abstract 
 
We evaluate the environmental and economic effects of Beijing’s driving restrictions. 
Based on daily data from multiple monitoring stations, air pollution falls 19% during 
every-other-day and 8% during one-day-per-week restrictions. Based on hourly 
viewership data, the number of television viewers during the restrictions increases 
1.7 to 2.3% for workers with discretionary work time but is unaffected for workers 
without, consistent with the restrictions’ higher per-day commute costs reducing 
daily labor. Causal effects are identified from both time-series and spatial variation in 
air quality and intra-day variation in viewership. We provide possible reasons for the 
policy’s success, including evidence of high compliance based on parking garage 
entrance records. Our results contrast with previous findings of no pollution 
reductions from driving restrictions and provide new evidence on commute costs and 
labor supply. 
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1. Introduction 
Driving restrictions have a long history as a way to reduce congestion. They date back 
to at least A.D. 125 when Julius Caesar banned horse-drawn vehicles from the narrow 
alleys around the Colosseum and the Roman Forum during the day because chariot 
traffic disrupted pedestrians.1 In modern times, pollution reduction has emerged as an 
added rationale and such restrictions are now used in many cities around the world.2 
Despite the prevalence of driving restrictions, there is little empirical evidence of their 
effect on pollution and even less about their effect on economic activity. Empirical 
evidence is critical because such restrictions may be ineffective either due to non-
compliance or compensating responses such as inter-temporal substitution of driving. 
At the same time, if effective, they impact economic activity by increasing commute 
costs and reducing workers’ willingness to supply labor for given compensation. 
 
We provide empirical evidence on the costs and benefits of driving restrictions 
instituted by the Beijing government in preparation for the 2008 Olympics. The 
restrictions prevented driving every other day based on license plate numbers. Their 
stringency was later reduced to one day per week, but they remain in place. On the 
benefits side, we find that the restrictions significantly reduced air pollution. Using 
daily data and a regression discontinuity design (RDD), our point estimates indicate 
that the every-other-day restrictions reduced total pollution by 19% and one-day-a-
week restrictions by 8%. We find evidence of inter-temporal substitution of driving 
but the compensation is small relative to the primary reduction. 
 
To rule out confounding factors besides auto usage, we use a differences-in-
differences (DD) approach that combines the time-series variation with geographic 
variation in monitoring stations’ locations. Stations closest to a road experience the 
largest drop in pollution and the drop becomes negligible at a distance consistent with 
the pollution’s ambient properties. This means any confounding factors must be 
related to proximity to roads. We consider, and rule out, changes in gasoline prices, 
parking rates, number of taxis, emissions standards, and government-imposed 
working hours. 
 
1 See “The Cars that Ate London, Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam, Rome, Madrid, Vienna, Athens ..,” Time, 
February 16, 2003 and “Fighting Traffic Congestion with Information Technology,” Issues in Science 
and Technology, Fall 2002. Caesar’s edict was later reversed due to the increased noise this created 
during the nighttime – early evidence of the inter-temporal substitution such restrictions can create. 
2 These include Santiago, Chile; Mexico City, Mexico; São Paulo, Brazil; Bogotá, Columbia; San Jose, 
Costa Rica; and several Italian cities. See Mahendra (2008) and “With Mixed Results, Cities Battle 
Traffic and Pollution,” Spiegel Online, April 4, 2005. 
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Given the restrictions’ benefit in reducing pollution, we investigate the cost they 
impose on economic activity. We show in a simple model that driving restrictions can 
reduce pollution, but, if so, the increased commute costs they create can reduce days 
worked per week for those who have discretionary work time (self-employed workers 
in our data). The effect on work day length is ambiguous because of changes in 
workers’ commute modes (many workers prefer driving even if it is slower than 
public transit) and the consequent changes in congestion. However, it is possible that 
these workers fully compensate for fewer work days by increasing daily hours. Those 
with fixed work times (hourly workers in our data) must work specific hours. 
Therefore, the restrictions will affect neither their days worked nor daily hours 
conditional on their remaining employed. 
 
Lacking direct measures of work time or daily traffic flows, we use a novel approach 
to indirectly measure labor supply. We rely on observed consumption of a major 
substitute – leisure time watching television (TV). Since the one-day-a-week driving 
restrictions apply during most workers’ regular working hours (they initially apply 
from 6:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. and later from 7:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.), we examine 
viewership during the restricted hours to ascertain the effect on days worked but also 
examine viewership outside the restricted hours to determine if work day length more 
than compensates for effects on days worked. 
 
Our empirical findings are consistent with the model’s predictions. Viewership by 
self-employed workers increases by 11 to 15% during the one-day-a-week restricted 
hours, consistent with some workers with endogenous labor supply reducing days 
worked and substituting leisure in response to higher commute costs. Viewership 
increases slightly outside the restricted hours ruling out the possibility that longer 
work hours more than compensate for the decrease in days worked. While we cannot 
say with certainty that output is reduced as a result, for this not to be so would require 
increased efficiency during the fewer remaining work hours. Viewership by hourly 
employees, on the other hand, is unaffected during restricted hours consistent with 
these workers having no choice over number of days worked. Although daily work 
hours for these workers should also remain unchanged, their leisure time could 
change depending on changes in commute modes and congestion. We find a 
negligible increase in viewership outside the restricted hours. 
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Besides providing evidence on the restrictions’ labor supply effects, the viewership 
results further corroborate our pollution results. They rule out confounding factors 
that decrease both public transit and auto commute times, such as expanded subway 
capacity, because leisure time would also increase for those with fixed work times. 
 
The only other detailed economic analysis of driving restrictions is Davis (2008),3 
who finds no discernible effect on pollution from a similar policy in Mexico City.4 
Our work differs in three key respects. First, we use geographic in addition to time-
series variation in pollution measures to identify the effects. Second, we examine the 
impact on work time. Third, while Davis (2008) only describes the penalties and 
detection methods used in Mexico City, we provide direct, detailed compliance 
evidence. In the absence of publicly-available violations data, we gathered data from a 
centrally-located Beijing parking garage. All parking garages in Beijing are required 
to record the time and license plate numbers of all entering cars but are not required to 
report offenders. Using this minute-by-minute data, we find a high level of 
compliance. This high level of compliance is one possible reason for the dramatic 
difference in effectiveness compared to Mexico City. 
 
Chen, Jin, Kumar, and Shi (2011) employ DD estimation using nearby cities as a 
control group and find that Beijing’s Olympics-related policies decreased pollution. 
The paper complements ours in that it finds that the driving restrictions were one of 
two effective policies, but differs in several respects. They explicitly examine only the 
effects of the brief, every-other-day restrictions5 and do not consider labor supply 
effects. Also, their DD approach, which relies on satellite measures of pollution and 
distinguishes areas with higher road density, cannot rule out confounding factors that 
lower both auto and public transit congestion, such as expanded subway capacity. Our 
TV viewership results fulfill this role. 
 
Our results imply that driving restrictions can effectively reduce air pollution, 
although at the cost of less work time by those with discretionary labor supply. Our 
study also adds to the very small empirical literature on commute costs and labor 
 
3 Policy papers examining driving restrictions include Osakwe (2010); Cropper, Jiang, Alberini, and 
Baur (2010); and Cambridge Systematics, Inc. (2007). 
4 Salas (2010) finds that the Davis (2008) results are sensitive to assumptions about time window and 
time trend. Eskeland and Feyzioglu (1995) use data on gasoline consumption to conclude that the 
Mexico City restrictions increased driving but they do not control for any pre-existing time trend. 
5 See Table 11 which controls only for the every-other-day policy. In Table 12 the authors include 
time-period dummies that extend partially into the one-day-per-week policy and conclude that it 
becomes ineffective; however, the results show a sustained, although diminished, pollution decrease. 
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supply. Relating the two is important for evaluating how transport changes will affect 
worker productivity. In particular, our finding that driving restrictions reduce work 
time has important implications for tax policy. It implies that shifting from an income 
to a commuting-related tax will not necessarily help reduce the work-time distortion 
created by an income tax. We know of only one study that relates commute cost 
changes to work time changes while properly controlling for endogeneity. Gutierrez-i-
Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2010) find a very small elasticity of labor supply with 
respect to commute distance. In contrast to their study, we distinguish workers with 
and without discretion over work time, allowing us to compare control and treatment 
groups as well as separately identify the effect on those with discretion. This is 
important since business owners and entrepreneurs, important sources of new jobs and 
innovations, often have such discretion. 
 
2. Pollution-Relevant Policies 
Air pollution and its health implications are a major concern in Beijing, which is 
ranked the thirteenth “most polluted city” in the world in 2004 for suspended 
particulates, the pollutant we examine.6 Matus et al. (2011) estimate that the 2005 
cost of suspended particulates for China in total was $22.4 billion (in 1997 USD). 
Beyond these economic costs, air pollution has been linked to infant mortality (Ch
and Greenstone (2003) specifically for suspended particulates and Currie and Neid
(2005) for other types of air pollutants). Cars create about 50% of particulate air 
pollution, highlighting the importance of reducing their negative externalities in 
Beijing and China at large. 
 
In preparation for the 2008 Summer Olympics, the Beijing government implemented 
many measures which might reduce air pollution. Figure 1 shows a timeline of the 
major policies implemented before, during, and after the Olympics. Besides the 
driving restrictions, these included bus fare reductions, subway line openings, and 
temporary factory closures. During the Olympic period itself all non-essential 
factories were closed as were many businesses; and migrant workers (those without 
hukuos) were sent back to their home towns. Besides these specific policies, the 
government began gradually moving many factories outside of Beijing beginning in 
the mid-1990s. Although the government may have had other goals (e.g., reduced 
congestion or easier commutes) for some policies, they all could affect air pollution. 
 
 
6 See “Beijing Pollution: Facts and Figures,” BBC News, August 11, 2008. 
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The driving restrictions we study began on July 20, 2008 when odd-even (“OddEven”) 
restrictions allowed cars to drive only every-other-day. The OddEven policy applied 
seven days a week and to all hours except midnight to 3:00 a.m. These restrictions 
were lifted on September 20. On October 11, the government re-instated driving 
restrictions, now preventing cars from driving one-day-per-week (“OneDay”). The 
OneDay restrictions applied only on weekdays and initially only between 6:00 a.m. 
and 9:00 p.m. We call this policy period “OneDay69.” On April 11, 2009 the daily 
restricted period changed to apply between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. and remained 
unchanged beyond the end of our sample period. We call this period “OneDay78” and 
use OneDay to apply to the combined OneDay69 and OneDay78 periods. 
 
The OddEven and OneDay policies restricted vehicles based on the last digit of their 
license plate numbers. During the OddEven policy, license plates ending in odd 
numbers could drive only on odd-numbered dates and those ending in even numbers 
only on even-numbered. The OneDay policy applied to weekdays with two out of the 
ten plate numbers restricted each day so that the restrictions followed a weekly cycle. 
The pairing of digits remained the same week-to-week ((0, 5), (1, 6), (2, 7), (3, 8), (4, 
9)) but the assignment of these pairs to weekdays were initially rotated each month 
and, beginning April 11, 2009, every thirteen weeks. 
 
The OddEven and OneDay69 policies applied to all areas within and including the 5th 
Ring Road while the OneDay78 policy applied to all areas within but not including 
the 5th Ring Road (Figure 2 shows these areas). Police cars, taxis, ambulances, postal 
vehicles, and embassy cars were exempt although these are small in number. 
 
We regressed our pollution measure on dummy variables for all of the policies in 
Figure 1. Although other policies may have been effective but drowned out 
statistically, the driving restrictions were the only policies that were significant. This 
is consistent with the results of Chen, et al. (2011) who find that plant closures and 
traffic control were the most effective of Beijing’s Olympics-related pollution 
reduction measures. 
 
As Figure 1 shows, a number of policies occurred around the time of the driving 
restrictions. In particular, the opening of subway Line 8, although it serves only the 
Olympic Park area and has a length of only 4.8 kilometers, almost exactly coincided 
with the start of OneDay69. It is therefore critical to rule out confounding factors. To 
do so, we supplement our time-series evidence with DD results across different 
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pollution monitoring locations and DD results using TV viewership across workers 
with and without discretionary work time. 
 
3. Theoretical Background 
In this section we discuss the relevant theoretical predictions that we test. Appendix A 
contains an illustrative model that predicts the short-run effects of Beijing’s driving 
restrictions on pollution and economic activity. We outline the model here and discuss 
its main results but direct the reader to the appendix for details. The model considers 
two groups of workers: those with discretionary work time and those with fixed work 
times.7 Since most Beijing workers with fixed work times must arrive at work by 8:30 
a.m. and stay until 5:30 p.m.,8 we assume a fixed and equal number of daily work 
hours for them. 
 
Within each group there is a distribution of workers with heterogeneous commute 
times and costs, wages, and non-wage income. In the first stage, each worker chooses 
their optimal commute mode (auto, public transit, or not working if they have 
discretion over work time). In stage two, each chooses work time, leisure time, and 
goods consumption to maximize utility given their first-stage choice. Workers 
consider how their commute mode choice affects their utility so we solve the model 
by backward induction. For each worker, commute modes differ in their monetary 
cost, time, and non-monetary disutility. The last allows for the fact that some workers 
prefer one commute mode over the other even if it requires more time and greater 
monetary cost. Examples of non-monetary disutility are expending effort to commute, 
bearing the burden of a crowded subway, or inhaling exhaust fumes while in traffic. 
 
We modify a standard Cobb-Douglas labor supply function to accommodate commute 
mode choice and distinguish restricted from non-restricted days. We assume a linear 
wage function but comment on relaxing this assumption below. We model the 
OddEven restrictions and consider each worker’s utility over a representative two-day 
period: one non-restricted and one restricted day. On the restricted day the worker 
suffers a penalty for driving. Absent the policy, the two days are identical. We 
consider the OddEven policy because it is simpler to model than and generates the 
 
7 The restrictions apply to non-commuters but they likely have greater flexibility for inter-temporal 
substitution. Including non-commuters, as our pollution data does, will bias us toward finding no 
effects. Since our viewership data is comprised only of workers the model applies directly to it. 
According to the 3rd Beijing Transportation Comprehensive Survey (Beijing Transportation Research 
Center, 2006), 48% of daily Beijing travelers across all modes are commuters. 
8 After our sample period (beginning April 12, 2010) official working hours became 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. 
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same intuition as the OneDay policy.9 After solving the model for each worker we 
examine the aggregate effects on pollution and work time across the distributions of 
workers. The model considers only first-order effects but we comment on second-
order effects due to changes in congestion below. The model assumes: 
(A) Absent the restrictions, commute times and costs are low enough that it is optimal 
for all workers to work both days. 
(B) Compliance costs are small enough that workers do not leave the workforce10 or 
transition between jobs with discretionary and fixed work times. 
(C) Wages and house prices do not adjust, workers do not move their residences or 
change their workplace (i.e., commute times and costs are fixed), and workers do 
not purchase a second car to comply with the restrictions.11 
(D) The penalty is great enough that it is never optimal to drive on a restricted day. 
(E) License plate numbers are uniformly distributed with half restricted each day. 
The driving restrictions affect work time on both an extensive margin (days worked) 
and an intensive margin (daily work hours conditional on working that day). Workers 
who are indifferent between working and staying home on a particular day determine 
the extensive margin. Workers who are indifferent between extending and not 
extending their daily work time determine the intensive margin. Extensive margin 
effects are relevant for pollution effects because they determine the number of 
aggregate daily auto trips. Leisure (and therefore TV viewership) is affected on both 
margins since it depends on both the number of days and daily hours worked. 
 
Those with discretion may choose to work either “full time” (both days) or “reduced 
time” (one day). Assumption (A) and diminishing marginal utility of consumption 
ensure that the worker will at most remain home on the restricted day. We consider 
only a representative two-day period so all restricted days are identical. As a result, 
“reduced time” means taking every other day off from work. A more general model 
with random variation in daily productivity and leisure options would allow for less 
 
9 It is straightforward to adapt the model to the OneDay policy and the results differ only in magnitude. 
The commute costs it imposes are lower making “reduced time” less likely. However, declining 
marginal utility makes “reduced time” more likely because goods consumption suffers less from not 
working one day out of five rather than one day out of two. A full analysis of the OneDay model is 
available from the authors. 
10 Gibbons and Machin (2006) discuss the theoretical effect of increased commute costs on the labor 
participation/non-participation margin. Black, Kolesnikova, and Taylor (2010) find that female labor 
force participation rates are lower in cities with longer commute times consistent with women as the 
primary margin of labor supply adjustments. 
11 Eskeland and Feyzioglu (1995) model this last effect. Due to the integer nature of car purchases, 
some households are on the margin between zero and one car while others are on the margin between 
one and two. Driving restrictions reduce the service flow from owning a single vehicle and can lead the 
former to sell their vehicle but the latter to buy another vehicle. 
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regular and extreme reductions. This simple model is adequate since we do not use it 
for calibration or direct estimation. We first discuss the theoretical implications for 
the extensive margin as it relates to both pollution and work time. 
 
Extensive Margin Effects: Absent the restrictions both days are identical and workers 
in both categories work “full time” by Assumption (A) and choose the same commute 
mode on both days. Whether a worker chooses to commute by public transit or auto 
depends on the costs and times they face for each, their return from working as 
determined by their wage, and the consumption their non-wage income provides. 
 
For those with fixed work times, the restrictions have no impact on the extensive 
margin since they do not control their work times. They must work each day for 
specific hours and will take public transit on the restricted day regardless of their 
preferred mode when unconstrained. Therefore, 
Implication 1: Across all workers with fixed work times, days worked (the extensive 
margin) and therefore days spent entirely on leisure are unchanged due to the policy. 
 
The extensive margin effect for workers with discretionary work time depends on 
their preferred commute mode absent the restrictions. Those who prefer public transit 
are unaffected and will continue taking public transit both days. Given Assumption 
(D), workers who prefer to drive can either take public transit or not work on their 
restricted day.12 Some will choose the latter due to the higher commute costs and 
instead substitute to leisure activities, including watching TV. There are two ways in 
which the higher commute costs may manifest themselves (Appendix C provides the 
details). First, ignoring non-monetary disutility from commuting, “reduced time” is 
preferable if public transit is sufficiently slower or more costly than driving. Second, 
even if public transit is cheaper and faster, “reduced time” is preferred if public transit 
is sufficiently unpleasant (non-monetary disutility is high). Therefore, 
Implication 2: Across all workers with discretionary work time, days worked (the 
extensive margin) decrease and days spent entirely on leisure increase due to the 
policy. 
 
These are the first-order effects on the extensive margin. Second-order effects may 
attenuate these. Auto congestion will decline and public transit congestion will 
 
12 Appendix B shows that it is not optimal to work on the restricted day and instead stay home on the 
non-restricted day under fairly general conditions. 
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increase. This will induce some people to drive who otherwise would take public 
transit on their non-restricted day. 
 
Given Assumption (D) and that all workers continue to work on their non-restricted 
day, the effects on pollution are straightforward. One-half of workers in each category 
who prefer to drive cannot do so on a given day. Therefore, 
Implication 3: Total auto commutes and pollution decrease due to the policy. 
 
Because our model does not consider non-work driving and assumes all days are work 
days, there is no possibility of inter-temporal substitution. In a more general model, 
workers may drive more on their non-restricted day because they cannot on the 
restricted day.13 This will attenuate the pollution effects and lower empirical estimates. 
 
Intensive Margin Effects (Workers with Fixed Work Times): Although the 
restrictions do not affect work hours for workers with fixed work times, they may 
affect daily leisure time due to altered commute modes. Those who took public transit 
absent the restrictions will still do so and their daily leisure time is unaffected. For 
those who prefer to drive absent the restrictions, leisure is unaffected on non-
restricted days since they continue to drive. However, on restricted days they are 
forced to take public transit. Their leisure time increases if public transit commuting is 
faster than auto and decreases if not. Since our empirical data on leisure includes both 
commute modes, we are interested in the aggregate effect. Intensive margin effects 
are zero for those who normally take public transit and ambiguous for those who 
normally drive; therefore,14 
Implication 4: Daily hours spent working (the intensive margin) across all workers 
with fixed work times is unaffected by the policy. However, daily hours spent on 
leisure could either increase or decrease due to the policy. 
 
Intensive Margin Effects (Workers with Discretionary Work Time): Intensive 
margin effects for workers with discretionary work time vary depending on whether 
they choose to work “full time” or “reduced time” and whether they prefer taking 
public transit or driving. Workers who prefer public transit absent the restrictions 
continue to work “full time” and take public transit both days so their work and 
leisure time remain the same. Those who prefer driving and choose to work “full 
 
13 Under the OneDay policy the restrictions also do not apply on the weekends allowing for more inter-
temporal substitution. We allow for this in our empirical tests. 
14 The second-order effects (increased public transit and decreased auto commute times) of the 
restrictions also impact Implications 4 and 5 but do not change the ambiguity of the implications. 
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time,” on the other hand, must commute by public transit on the restricted day. As a 
result, daily leisure time increases or decreases depending on whether public transit 
commute times and costs are less or more than those by car. Unlike those with fixed 
work times, commute costs matter because daily labor supply is discretionary. Due to 
diminishing marginal utility, the worker equalizes leisure time across the work days 
and shares the difference in commute times and costs across the restricted and non-
restricted days. 
 
For workers with discretion who work “reduced time,” leisure time most likely 
decreases on the non-restricted day. Leisure time can increase if non-wage income is 
high but this is unlikely. In general, leisure time will decrease because workers will 
compensate for working fewer days by working longer daily hours. Since our 
empirical data on leisure time includes “full-” and “reduced-time” workers using 
either commute mode, we are interested in the aggregate effect. Intensive margin 
effects are zero for those who take public transit, ambiguous for those who work “full 
time” and normally drive, and ambiguous but likely positive for those who work 
“reduced time.” Therefore, 
Implication 5: Daily hours spent working (the intensive margin) across all workers 
with discretionary work time could either increase or decrease due to the policy. As a 
result, daily hours spent on leisure could either increase or decrease due to the policy. 
 
Our results for those choosing “reduced-time” are consistent with Gutiérrez-i-
Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2009), who consider a general, concave wage function. 
Commute costs are fixed per daily trip so workers reduce the number of trips and 
generally spread these costs over longer daily hours. Allowing for a concave wage 
function in our model would lead to a smaller share of workers working “reduced 
time” and a smaller increase in daily work hours because declining marginal 
productivity of work would lead to a decline in wages with longer daily work hours. 
 
4. Data 
We use two primary data sets. The first is a daily measure of Beijing air pollution at 
both an aggregate and individual monitoring-station level. The second is an hourly 
measure of TV viewership by different categories of Beijing residents. We 
supplement these with control variables thought to affect air pollution and TV 
viewership. Our sample is from January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2009. This provides 
us with 1,096 total days of which 547 days occur before OddEven, 62 during 
OddEven, 21 between OddEven and OneDay, 182 days during OneDay69, and 265 
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days during OneDay78. This provides a fairly symmetric window – approximately 1.5 
years both before and during the policy regimes. Appendix E provides descriptions 
and Table 1 summary statistics for all variables. 
 
Pollution Data: Our pollution measure is the daily Beijing Air Pollution Index (API) 
published by the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) and Beijing 
Environmental Protection Bureau (BJEPB). We use the API at both the individual 
monitoring-station15 and aggregate levels. The latter is a simple average of the 
station-level APIs. Station composition varied a little over time. In 2007 the aggregate 
API is based on 28 stations. Five stations are dropped and four added for a net total
27 stations to compute the aggregate API in 2008 and 2009. Figure 2 shows locations 
of monitoring stations in 2008 and 2009. Chen, et al. (2011) provide evidence on th
accuracy of the Beijing API using independent satellite data. 
 
The API is intended to provide specific advice on behavior (e.g., not exercising or 
spending time outdoors) and ranges from 0 to 500 with higher values indicating 
stronger pollution concentrations and more harmful effects (see USEPA (2009) for 
details). Its value depends on concentrations of three different pollutants which affect 
proper breathing: particulate matter (PM10), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), and sulfur 
dioxide (SO2). An API is calculated for each of the three pollutants but only the 
maximum one is reported. To compare the relative severity of the three pollutants, the 
concentration of each is rescaled before choosing the maximum.16 PM10 is converted 
to the API based on the piecewise linear function shown in Table 2. 
 
The maximum pollutant is identified only if the API exceeds 50. We focus on PM10 
since it is the predominant pollutant on 917 of the 953 days with an API above 50. 
PM10 is the ambient concentration (in μg/m3) of particulates smaller than 10μm. Since 
there are 143 days when the API is below 50 and the maximum pollutant is 
unidentified and 29 days when the worst pollutant is other than PM10,17 we estimate 
two different specifications. In one we include all days regardless of pollutant type. In 
the other we allow our policy variables to have a differential effect when the API is 
 
15 We thank Steven Q. Andrews for making this data available to us. Our description of the pollution 
data is based on Andrews (2008). 
16 Specifically, for the daily, station-level API an average concentration at each station for each of the 
three pollutants is first calculated across 24 hourly readings. Each of the three is converted to an API 
measure and the maximum is the daily API reading for that station. For the aggregate API, an average 
is taken across all stations of the average daily concentration at each station for each pollutant and then 
each is scaled to an API. The maximum API of the three pollutants is the daily aggregate API. 
17 The other 7 days when the API is above 50 the pollutant identity is missing. 
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below versus above 50 and when a pollutant other than PM10 is predominant. In our 
sample, the API ranges from 12 to 500 and averages 91. 
 
Various sources create particulate matter, but autos are the major contributor in most 
urban areas. Autos create PM10 through emissions and by creating road dust.18 Hao, 
Wang, Li, Hu, and Yu (2005) find that approximately 53% of Beijing’s PM10 is 
attributable to motor vehicles – 23% due to emissions and 30% due to road dust.19 As 
a rough rule of thumb, therefore, autos create half of the air pollution we measure. 
 
TV Viewership Data: We use TV viewership to measure how driving restrictions 
affect work time. In the absence of data on work and total leisure time, viewership is a 
good proxy for two reasons. First, it is a large component of leisure and therefore a 
big substitute for work time.20 Second, using viewership will bias us against finding 
any effect due to the restrictions. Outdoor activities are likely to become more 
attractive under the restrictions because auto congestion and pollution are reduced. 
Since TV viewership is consumed indoors it becomes relatively unattractive 
compared to other leisure.21 
 
Our viewership measure is CSM Media Research’s “Television Audience 
Measurement” (TAM) database, the most comprehensive TV ratings data in China. 
TAM measures the number of people watching each TV program and commercial. 
We aggregate to the hourly level across all channels. TAM’s Beijing ratings are based 
on a panel of households, although the data is captured at the individual level. Panelist 
data is collected through a “PeopleMeter,” an electronic device installed inside the TV 
that detects when it is on and, if so, to what channel it is tuned. Each panelist 
household has a remote-control device to enter which members are currently watching, 
which is displayed on the screen for confirmation. This provides individual- rather 
than household-level data. CSM’s Beijing data covers an area very similar to that 
subject to the driving restrictions. It includes all areas inside the 5th Ring Road and 
only a small part of the outside suburban area. 
 
18 Some governments measure PM2.5, which includes only smaller particulates (below 2.5 μm) and does 
not capture road dust. 
19 Jiang, X. (“23% of PM10 in Beijing Comes From Vehicular Emissions,” Road Traffic and Safety, 1, 
45, 2006 (in Chinese)) and Dong, Liu, and Che (2008) corroborate this breakdown, finding that 23% 
and 24% respectively of Beijing’s PM10 is due to auto emissions. Cui, Deng, and Guo (2009) estimate 
that autos create 62% of all air pollutants, including PM10. 
20 A 2008 survey conducted by the Beijing Statistics Bureau (2009) estimates that the average Beijing 
resident spends 7.6 hours working, 1.4 hours commuting, 1.8 hours on household chores, and 3.5 hours 
on leisure activities during a work day. TV watching comprises 1.9 hours or 54% of total leisure time. 
21 TV viewing on mobile devices is extremely limited during our sample period. 
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TAM provides viewership data for seven different employment categories. We use 
two categories for which we can ascertain the degree of control that its members have 
over their work time. Those in the “self-employed” category likely have discretion 
over their work time. The “hourly workers” category includes mainly hourly 
employees who have fixed work times. The work time of an “hourly worker” could 
vary at their employer’s discretion but only in the upward direction in the form of 
overtime. We do not utilize the other five TAM categories either because we do not 
have specific predictions for them or we are uncertain whether they have control over 
their work time.22 CSM also conducts an establishment survey estimating the number 
of individuals in each category with TV access so that viewership rates can be 
translated into numbers of individuals watching TV. Table 1 provides summary 
statistics for each category. On average, across all hours there are 91 thousand “self-
employed” and 149 thousand “hourly workers” watching TV although the number 
varies greatly across hours. 
 
Control Variables: In our pollution regressions, we include a variety of daily weather 
variables known to affect particulate matter (see USEPA, 2010) all taken from China 
Meteorological Data Sharing Service System. We include dummies for the four 
quartiles of the daily maximum wind speed.23 Higher wind speeds lower pollutant 
levels. Beijing air quality is greatly affected by wind direction. Northerly winds carry 
local pollutants while Easterly and Southeasterly bring pollutants from the Eastern 
coastal and mid-China cities (Wiedensohler, et al., 2007). To control for this flexibly, 
we use dummies for the four directional quadrants and interact these with the four 
wind speeds. We include the daily hours of sunshine to control for the amount of 
atmospheric solar radiation, which allows ozone to form creating secondary pollutants. 
 
Humidity can interact with pollutants to create secondary ones so we include daily 
average humidity. Precipitation has opposing effects. Rain can interact with existing 
pollutants to create secondary ones, but can also wash pollutant particles from the air 
and minimize their formation. To control for either possibility, we include total daily 
rainfall. Finally, we control for daily maximum surface temperature, which has an 
 
22 For brevity we call TAM’s “proprietor/private” category as “self-employed” and for clarity we refer 
to “workers” as “hourly workers.” The unused categories are “unemployed,” “cadres/managers,” 
“junior civil servants,” “students,” and “other.” 
23 Maximum is across averages during all ten-minute periods of the day. We experimented with using 
average daily speed, wind gusts (maximum speed during any three-second period), and maximum level 
directly. Quartiles of maximum daily speed provided the best fit of all these. 
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indeterminate effect on particulate matter since it depends primarily on whether a 
temperature inversion is created. 
 
We include dummy variables to allow for different driving behavior on weekends and 
holidays and monthly dummies to allow for seasonal effects. We also include a 
dummy for the Olympic period. Since this largely coincides with the OddEven policy 
period and temporary factory closures, we will emphasize our OneDay results. To 
control for the other government policies discussed earlier and any pre-existing trend, 
we include a flexible daily time trend. Since this is an imperfect control, we 
supplement our RDD regressions with station-level and viewership DD regressions, 
both of which provide evidence that the driving restrictions cause the pollution effects. 
 
For the viewership regressions, we include daily weather variables that might affect 
the desire to remain indoors watching TV rather than being outside. These include 
total rainfall, average wind speed, total hours of sunshine, and average surface 
temperature. We use daily measures even though our regressions are at the hourly 
level because we assume households decide whether to go to work based on daily 
expected weather. We include hourly dummies to capture intra-day variation in the 
appeal of other leisure activities (including sleep) and TV program quality. Similarly, 
we include weekend and holiday dummies to capture program differences and the 
appeal of outdoor options during these times. We include monthly dummies to 
capture seasonality in outdoor activity, and a dummy for the Olympic period since 
programming differed greatly then. To control for any pre-existing trend prior to the 
policy change we include a flexible daily time trend. 
 
5. Effect of Driving Restrictions on Pollution 
Implication 3 predicts that traffic density and therefore pollution should decline 
during the policy periods. To test this we employ an RDD method using the aggregate 
Beijing API. Intuitively, our test determines if any pre-existing time trend in pollution 
is altered during the policy periods conditional on the control variables. Since 
coincident factors may confound these results, we provide additional evidence based 
on DD estimates using station-level API data. This geographic variation allows us to 
relate the policy impact to each station’s distance from a major road. We find that 
these local API measures dropped less due to the policies for stations further from a 
major road than they did for those closer and that the effects dissipate at a distance 
consistent with the atmospheric behavior of PM10. 
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Effect on Aggregate Pollution: To determine the effect of the driving restrictions on 
aggregate pollution we employ an RDD method. We allow for a potential 
discontinuity in each of the policy regimes (OddEven, OneDay69, and OneDay78 
denoted by OE , , and ): 69OD 78OD
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A
tAPI  is the aggregate API on day ,  are monthly dummies designed to capture 
any seasonality not captured by the weather controls, 
t tm
tZ  contains weather and other 
control variables,  is a weekend dummy, and  is a holiday dummy. We 
include the lagged API to allow for persistence in air conditions across days. The 
vector 
tWE tHO
4β  captures any pre-existing time trend using an th-order polynomial 
function of days t . 
L
5β  captures any differences in pollution on weekends and 6β  does 
the same during holidays. 7 9β −  are the primary coefficients of interest and capture any 
discontinuity due to the policies. 10 11β −  capture any inter-temporal substitution to 
weekends within the OneDay policy periods. We expect 10 11β −  to be weakly positive. 
 
Column 1 of Table 3 shows a baseline regression with no time trend. The OddEven 
and OneDay coefficients are both negative and highly statistically significant. In 
Columns 2 and 3, we introduce linear and quadratic time trends. The monthly 
dummies remain so that any identified time trend is of seasonally-adjusted data. None 
of the time trend coefficients is significant under either the linear or quadratic 
specifications and an F-test (the bottom row of Table 3) reveals that the time trend 
coefficients are not jointly significant.24 The main difference from the baseline results 
is that the OneDay coefficient is larger. This is because the OneDay policy variable is 
highly correlated with a time trend. This indicates the importance of our station-level 
and viewership evidence presented later which do not rely exclusively on time-series 
variation. To be conservative, we focus on the smaller effects of the baseline model. 
 
Both policy variables are highly statistically significant and show a decrease in 
pollution during the restricted periods (Appendix F shows this visually). The 
aggregate API was 19.3% lower during the OddEven restrictions and the 95% 
confidence interval is 14.9 to 23.6%. With perfect compliance, no substitution to non-
restricted hours, and a linear relationship between the number of cars and pollution, 
                                                 
24 We experimented with higher-order time trends and found the coefficients were jointly insignificant 
up to a 7th-order. The results are also robust to using year dummies rather than a time trend and 
allowing different time trends during the pre-treatment and policy periods as suggested in Angrist and 
Pischke (2009, page 255). There was also a four-day period (August 17 to 20, 2007) when odd-even 
restrictions were tested. Setting the OddEven variable to one for these days yields very similar results. 
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we would expect about a 25% decrease during the OddEven period (traffic reduced by 
50%25 and 50% of PM10 produced by motor vehicles).26 The aggregate API was 7.9% 
lower with a 95% confidence interval of 5.2 to 10.7% during the OneDay policy. We 
would expect about a 10% decline (traffic reduced by 20% each day and 50% of PM10 
created by motor vehicles). These estimates are consistent with a high level of 
compliance. We control separately for substitution to weekends and find that the API 
increases 9.7% during OneDay weekends. Although this percentage increase is 
similar to the weekday decrease, the weekend API is lower and applies to two days 
rather than five so that overall pollution declines. 
 
Of the control variables, approximately 31% of the API persists day to day. Even after 
controlling for this, a Durbin-Watson test revealed that the residuals exhibited order-
one autocorrelation so we use Newey-West standard errors with a one-day lag in all 
aggregate API regressions.27 The API was significantly lower during the Olympics, 
consistent with the decreased business, construction, and resident population during 
that time. A one-degree temperature increase is associated with a 4.8% increase in the 
API – consistent with greater ozone and secondary pollution creation. A one-percent 
increase in humidity increases the API by 0.5%, consistent with humidity acting to 
create secondary pollutants. Rainfall has no significant effect, but each additional 
hour of sunshine decreases the API by 3.3%. 
 
Wind direction has no significant effect, but wind speed does with the two middle 
quartiles leading to less pollution. This bowl-shaped effect may be due to moderate 
wind speeds preventing the build-up of pollution but very high wind speeds bringing 
in particulate matter from the nearby Gobi desert. API is 8.4% lower on weekends but 
not significantly different on holidays. In unreported coefficients, four of the nine 
interactions between wind speed and direction are significant and ten of the eleven 
monthly dummies are significant with December and January having the highest 
(worst) API levels and July and August having the best conditional on weather. 
 
 
25 As we describe in Section 2, very few cars are exempt from the restrictions. 
26 Substitution effects are likely small since the restrictions applied except from midnight to 3:00 a.m. 
Pollution rises convexly with car density because congestion causes cars to spend more time idling and 
a longer time traveling the same distance (see Arnott and Kraus, 2003; Small and Verhoef, 2007). 
During the OneDay policy, a larger adjustment for inter-temporal substitution is required because the 
OneDay restrictions do not apply in the late evening and early morning hours. 
27 We ran the baseline regression using OLS and the standard errors were very similar. Since aggregate 
API is constrained at a maximum of 500 we also ran a Tobit regression. The results were almost 
identical. We do not use this as our primary specification because we cannot control for autocorrelation. 
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Column 4 shows the results of estimating the baseline regression but distinguishing 
between OneDay69 and OneDay78. This is demanding since the only change in the 
policy from OneDay69 to OneDay78 is slightly shorter restricted hours. Coefficients 
on the non-policy variables are virtually identical. The two OneDay policy 
coefficients are very statistically significant. The point estimates indicate a 7.4% drop 
in the API during the OneDay69 restrictions and 8.3% during OneDay78. However, 
an F-test rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients are unequal only at the 80% level. 
 
Table 4 contains robustness checks. Column 1 repeats the baseline results from Table 
3 for comparison except we no longer display the effects of wind speed or direction to 
conserve space. Column 2 introduces dummy variables to distinguish observations 
where sulfur dioxide is the worst pollutant (“SO2”) or the API is below 50 and we do 
not know the primary pollutant (“Blue Sky”). We also interact these with the policy 
variables (there are no “SO2” days during the OddEven policy). The OddEven and 
OneDay effects are very similar: 18.9% and 8.8% decreases respectively. As expected, 
the “Blue Sky” dummy is highly significant and negative. The “SO2” dummy is 
significantly negative although we have no prior expectation on this. The only 
significant changes are that the API is less persistent across days and the Olympic 
variable is no longer significant consistent with many of the “Blue Sky” days 
occurring during the games. 
 
Column 3 uses log PM10 as the dependent variable using the transformation in Table 2 
to convert from the API. Because we must drop “Blue Sky” and “SO2” days, the 
number of observations falls to 916 and we cannot use Newey-West standard errors 
although we continue to include the lagged dependent variable even though the lag 
sometimes exceeds one day. The results are similar to the baseline API results. 
 
Effect on Station-Level Pollution: The RDD results depend entirely on time-series 
variation and therefore could be due to contemporaneous, confounding factors. To 
reduce this possibility, we use geographic variation in the location of individual 
monitoring stations and apply a DD test.28 These regressions test whether pollution 
decreased more for monitoring stations that were located closer to major roads than 
for stations located further away in response to the policies. The regression is: 
 
28 Another DD approach would be to use any non-uniformity in the plate number distribution and allow 
for differential effects in which plate numbers were restricted on a given day. However, plate numbers 
were assigned randomly by the Beijing Traffic Management Bureau for a uniform fee through March 9, 
2009. Only after that could a plate number be selected from a set of available numbers for a fee. Since 
April 10, 2009 plates can be exchanged at no cost but only from a list of ten numbers. 
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where SstAPI  is the daily API at station  on day t . As before, we include lagged API 
to capture persistence, monthly dummies to capture seasonality, control variables, a 
flexible time trend to capture any pre-existing trend, a weekend dummy to allow for 
differential effects, and an OneDay-weekend interaction to allow for inter-temporal 
substitution. Our DD estimator is implemented by including station-level fixed-effects 
s
( )sα  and a polynomial function of distance ( )sDist  between each station and the 
nearest major road interacted with the policy variables. A positive coefficient for 7β  
( 8β ) indicates more pollution reduction for stations in closer proximity to a major 
road during the OddEven (OneDay) periods. Fixed-effects control for any time-
constant, station-specific factors that affect pollution, including stationary sources of 
pollution such as a nearby factory as well as the baseline effect of distance. We use 
robust standard errors clustered at the station level to allow for general autocorrelation 
within stations and general heteroskedasticity. 
 
We first confirm that results similar to those at the aggregate level are obtained with a 
station-level, fixed-effects regression (i.e., we set ). We use a panel of 24 
stations, 22 of which operated the entire time and two of which operated from 2008 to 
2009.
0J =
29 There are a few missing observations because no API was reported for some 
days at some stations. Column 1 of Table 5 shows the results. We find similar effects 
to those from our aggregate API estimates, except that the magnitude of the OneDay 
coefficient is greater and the control variables are generally more significant. The 
OddEven policy reduces the API by 18.2% and the OneDay policy by 14.7%. We 
again find evidence of substitution to weekends with pollution 6.9% greater on 
weekends during the OneDay policy. 
 
For our DD estimates, we use the minimum distance “as the crow flies” between a 
monitoring station and the nearest Ring Road.30 We use only the eight monitoring 
                                                 
29 A balanced panel would include only the 22 stations. We add the two stations because they are 
present during most of our time period and are located within the 4th Ring Road which adds identifying 
variation to our distance estimates below. The results using the balanced panel are very similar. 
30 Specifically, we use the Geographic Information System (GIS) software’s ARCINFO command 
“Near” to compute the distance between the monitoring station and the nearest point on the road. The 
busiest roads in Beijing are segments (East, West, North, or South) of the four Ring Roads (2nd, 3rd, 4th, 
or 5th) according to 2006 data from the Beijing Transportation Research Institute. To ensure our results 
do not depend on the choice of Ring Roads, we re-estimated using distances from the nearest Class 1 
road – any multi-lane highway with controllable entries and exits. The results were very similar. 
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stations within the 4th Ring Road for two reasons. First, using stations too far from 
major roads will bias against finding an effect because auto pollution will be 
dispersed widely enough that it will be indistinguishable from other pollution sources. 
Beijing’s road network is densest inside the 4th Ring Road and monitoring stations 
within this area are sufficiently close to roads to detect the effect of distance. Table 1 
confirms that stations within the 4th Ring Road are much closer to the nearest Ring 
Road than those outside. Second, none of the restrictions applied to the 6th Ring Road 
and the OneDay78 policy also did not apply to the 5th Ring Road. We would need to 
exclude these from our distance calculations since we do not know how traffic on 
them is affected. The restrictions decrease traffic if, absent the restrictions, it 
primarily feeds into the area within the 5th Ring Road. On the other hand, traffic 
increases if drivers use these roads more intensively to travel from one side of the city 
to the other while complying with the restrictions.31 This ambiguity also rules out 
using monitoring stations outside the 5th Ring Road as a control group for those inside 
in a DD specification. 
 
Column 2 of Table 5 shows the results of estimating Equation (2) using a linear 
function of distance ( . We include station fixed-effects and the same control 
variables. During the OddEven period pollution drops by 20.6% at the Ring Roads but 
the effect dissipates by 9.1 percentage points with each kilometer from the road. 
During the OneDay period pollution drops by 8.8% at the Ring Roads and dissipates 
by 5.8 percentage points with each kilometer. According to USEPA (2001, pp. 2 – 3), 
most PM10 emissions are deposited within a few kilometers of their release. 
Extrapolated slightly out of sample, our results imply that the pollution reduction 
dissipates at a distance of 2.3 kilometers for the OddEven policy and 1.5 kilometers 
for the OneDay policy. In Column 3 we allow for a quadratic function of distance 
. For the OddEven regime, both distance terms are significant, pollution drops 
at the Ring Road and the effect declines in distance with a minimum at 1.1 kilometers. 
The OneDay results are also significant with a minimum at 1.0 kilometers. 
1J =
( 2J =
 
Policy Comparisons: We can perform “back-of-the-envelope” calculations to 
determine the increase in gasoline prices or auto registration fees necessary to achieve 
the same pollution reduction as the OneDay policy (8%). Cheung and Thomson (2004) 
estimate a long-run gasoline price elasticity of -0.56 in China using data from 1980 to 
 
31 We estimated the regression in Column 1 of Table 5 but distinguished stations outside the 6th Ring 
Road during the OddEven and OneDay69 policies and stations outside the 5th Ring Road during the 
OneDay78 policy. We found no differential effect on these stations consistent with the restrictions 
reducing traffic that otherwise would have fed into the area inside the 5th Ring Road. 
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1999. The gas price at the midpoint of our sample is about RMB 6 per gallon, 
implying that a long-run price increase of RMB 0.85 per gallon (14%) would be 
required to achieve the same pollution reduction if pollution falls linearly with gas 
consumption. Another alternative is to increase registration fees to reduce the stock of 
cars. If registration is one-time and transferrable across owners, a fee increase is 
equivalent to a vehicle price increase. Deng and Ma (2010) estimate an own-price 
elasticity of -9.2 for autos in China using annual data from 1995 to 2001. The authors 
note that this estimate is about three times greater than estimates from U.S. data, 
possibly due to auto price elasticities declining with rising incomes. Given income 
increases in China since 2001 it is useful to consider a range of elasticities from -3.0 
to -9.2. If total miles driven falls linearly with car ownership and assuming an average 
car price of USD 15 thousand,32 a license fee increase of USD 130 to 400 (RMB 858 
to 2,631) would be required to obtain the same 8% pollution reduction. This compares 
to the current RMB 500 (USD 76) registration price in Beijing.33 
 
Alternative Explanations: Our DD results show that the policies affected different 
stations differently depending on their distance from the Ring Roads. Given this, any 
confounding factors must be related to proximity to major roads. Before moving to 
our viewership results we consider some possibilities. Retail gasoline prices are 
regulated by the National Development and Reform Commission (NRDC) and 
changed somewhat during our sample period. Prior to December 19, 2008, the NRDC 
set a baseline price and allowed firms to charge a retail price within 8% of it. After 
this, NRDC imposed a retail price ceiling. The timing of the price changes is 
generally different than that of the driving restrictions, although there was a 
significant price drop around the start of the OneDay restrictions which would bias 
against our findings. We added log retail price to our baseline aggregate API 
regression and the results were very similar.34 
 
 
32 Unless otherwise noted, all exchange rate conversions performed at January 2011 rates (1 RMB = 
0.152 USD). Most 2009 car purchasers targeted a car price of RMB 50 to 150 thousand according to 
“Annual Report of China Car Industry 2009 – 2010,” An, et al. (2010). The midpoint of this range 
yields USD 15.2 thousand. 
33 “Beijing’s Plan to Steer Clear of Traffic Jams,” China Daily, December 14, 2010. 
34 The price coefficient was insignificant in the regression. Price data taken from NDRC documents at 
the Beijing Development and Reform Council website (http://www.bjpc.gov.cn). 
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Regulated parking rates at public garages did not change during our sample period.35 
Private garages are allowed to charge market rates but this would bias against a 
reduction in driving. The number of official taxis in Beijing has remained constant at 
66,646 since 2006 under a decision by the Beijing Council of Transportation under 
the “Tenth Five-Year Plan.”36 Taxi cab emissions have declined over time through 
replacement of older taxis and upgrading of existing equipment but this has occurred 
gradually and would be captured by our time trend. Staggered working hours were 
officially adopted in Beijing for those employed by social organizations, non-profit 
institutions, state-owned enterprises, and urban collective-owned enterprises but this 
did not take effect until April 12, 2010, after our sample period. 
 
There were two changes in auto emissions regulations during our sample period. 
China’s emissions standards are similar to European Standards I to V. From the 
beginning of our data through February 28, 2008 autos registered in Beijing had to 
conform to the Level III standard and have an on-board system that stops the vehicle 
if the limit is exceeded. From March 1, 2008 through the end of our sample, new 
vehicles had to meet the Level IV standard, which requires 30% lower maximum 
emissions. The timing of these changes differs from those of the driving restrictions 
and since the change applied only to new vehicles it would occur gradually and be 
captured by the time trend. 
 
Beijing added subway capacity during our sample period (see Figure 1). The timings 
did not generally coincide with the OddEven and OneDay policies; however some of 
the effect that we measure could result from substitution from auto to public transit 
commuting. The following viewership results will eliminate this possibility. 
 
6. Effect of Driving Restrictions on TV Viewership 
We examine TV viewership for two reasons. The first reason is to provide evidence 
on the restrictions’ effect on economic activity. Implications 1 and 2 predict that the 
restrictions should have different extensive margin effects on leisure time (and 
therefore TV viewership) for workers with and without discretion over labor supply. 
We use viewership measures for two different employment categories in the TAM 
data – “self-employed” and “hourly workers” – to test this. Second, it provides a 
 
35 According to parking regulations in, “Notice of Adjusting the Rates for Non-Residential Parking 
Lots in Beijing,” Beijing Municipal Commission of Development and Reform (2010), File No. 144 (in 
Chinese) and “Notice of Adjusting the Rates of Motor Vehicle Parking Lots in Beijing,” Beijing 
Bureau of Commodity Prices (2002), File No. 194 (in Chinese). 
36 According to Beijing Statistic Yearbook (2007, 2008, 2009), China Statistics Press. 
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means to rule out additional confounding factors that might explain the pollution 
reductions. We contrast the effects on viewership for workers with and without 
discretionary work time. Any factors that reduce both auto and public transit 
congestion, such as expanding subway capacity, increase TV viewership for both 
groups – an implication we can test. 
 
Our comparison embeds RDD estimation within a DD design. We first estimate the 
policy’s effect on each worker category using an RDD. This estimates whether there 
is a discontinuity in viewership during the policy periods relative to any pre-existing 
time trend conditional on control variables. We then use a DD design to see if the 
policy change affects the two groups of workers differently. 
 
Since most workers’ regular work hours occur during the restricted hours, we measure 
extensive margin effects by changes in aggregate TV viewing during restricted hours. 
Although extensive margin changes may extend outside the restricted hours if work 
day length exceeds the restricted period, they will certainly affect viewership inside 
the restricted hours. Therefore, we can restate our two main testable implications as: 
Implication 1’:  During the policy period, TV viewership across all workers with fixed 
work times is unchanged during regular work (restricted) hours. 
Implication 2’: During the policy period, TV viewership across all workers with 
discretionary work time increases during regular work (restricted) hours. 
 
Since changes in the intensive margin will manifest themselves primarily outside the 
restricted hours, we measure intensive margin effects by changes in aggregate TV 
viewership outside the restricted hours. Given the less-than-perfect correspondence 
between the extensive margin and the restricted hours and since theory is ambiguous 
about the intensive margin effects (see Implications 4 and 5), our primary goal in 
estimating the intensive margin effects is to see if they overwhelm those on the 
extensive margin. 
 
To determine the restrictions’ effect on viewership for each worker category we 
employ an RDD design. We allow for a potential discontinuity for each of the three 
policies (OddEven, OneDay69, and OneDay78). For the OneDay69 and OneDay78 
policies we allow for intra-day discontinuities to estimate the effect on the extensive 
and intensive margins. We only allow for a daily discontinuity for the OddEven 
policy because intra-day work patterns were greatly disrupted by the Olympics. For 
the same reason, we will focus on the OneDay results. We estimate: 
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 is thousands of people watching TV on day t  during hour  for worker 
category c  (“self-employed” and “hourly workers”). We include lagged viewership 
because viewing is known to persist across programs (see Goettler and Shachar, 2001). 
This hourly dependency is separate from the daily time trend. The hourly dummies 
 capture baseline differences in hourly viewing and 
h
tZ  contains weather and 
other control variables. The vector 5β  captures any pre-existing time trend in d
viewership using an th-order polynomial function. 
aily 
L 6β  and 7β  capture differences in 
weekend and holiday viewership before the policy and 8β  captures change in 
viewership during the OddEven regime. 9 11β −  capture difference in viewership on 
weekends during the different policy regimes while 12 14β −  do the same for holidays. 
 
The primary coefficients of interest are 15 20β − , which capture differences in 
viewership during the OneDay periods relative to the pre-existing trend. We divide 
the day into three time segments to separately estimate the effects on the extensive 
and intensive margins. thRH
NM
20
 equals one during restricted hours and zero otherwise. 
For non-restricted hours,  equals one during morning hours (midnight to 6:00 
a.m. during OneDay69 and midnight to 7:00 a.m. during OneDay78) and 
equals one during evening hours (9:00 p.m. to midnight during OneDay69 and 
8:00 p.m. to midnight during OneDay78) and zero otherwise. We expect the extensive 
margin effects to be positive for “self-employed” (  and zero for “hourly 
workers” ( ) . 
thH
thNEH
)15 0β >
16 0β = 17β −  capture effects on the intensive margin and our theory is 
ambiguous about these. We use morning and evening segments as a parsimonious 
way to distinguish non-restricted periods with very different viewing patterns. As a 
robustness check we allow for fully flexible, hour-by-hour effects as discussed below. 
 
Table 6 displays the results of estimating Equation (3) for the “self-employed” and 
“hourly workers” categories. We employ a seventh-order polynomial function of days 
to control for any pre-existing trend – a choice we justify below. The residuals were 
found to have autocorrelation with a maximum lag of four hours, so we use Newey-
West standard errors with a four-hour lag. 
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Effect on Viewership by Workers with Discretionary Work Time: Columns 1 and 2 
display the results for “self-employed” workers. Viewership is persistent with 55% of 
viewers continuing to watch from the previous hour. Greater rainfall has a statistically 
significant effect but its magnitude is negligible. More hours of sunlight are 
associated with less TV viewership. “Self-employed” watch more TV on weekends, 
holidays, and during the Olympics. Viewership increases 11.6% during the OddEven 
policy but only by 2.4% during OddEven holidays. We do not have specific 
predictions for the OddEven period because the Olympics greatly altered regular work 
and leisure patterns then. 
 
The primary coefficients of interest are those on the interactions between the OneDay 
policies and time segments. These represent the differential viewership during the 
policy periods relative to the pre-existing time trend and conditional on the control 
variables. Implication 2 predicts that average viewership during restricted hours will 
increase as marginal workers who normally drive will find it too costly to do so on 
their restricted day. In fact, viewership during the OneDay69 restricted hours is 10.8% 
higher with a t-statistic of 6.6 and 15.2% higher during the OneDay78 restricted hours 
with a t-statistic of 7.1. Thus, on the extensive margin, workers with discretionary 
labor supply work less and enjoy more leisure in the restricted periods. 
 
Using TAM’s data on the total number of Beijing workers in each category we can 
convert these percentage effects to absolute changes. On average, there are 102.1 
thousand “self-employed” viewers during the OneDay69 restricted period. This 
implies an additional 11.0 thousand viewers per hour in the restricted OneDay69 
hours relative to without the policy. Assuming that preferences for TV viewing and 
sensitivity to commute costs are uncorrelated, this extrapolates to 1.7% of the 656 
thousand self-employed people in Beijing and 0.12% of the 9.2 million employed 
people.37 During the OneDay78 restricted hours there are an average of 98.1 thousand 
viewers so our estimates imply an increase of 14.9 thousand additional “self-
employed” viewers or 2.3% of all self-employed. 
 
Theoretically, viewership outside the restricted hours (the intensive margin) can either 
increase or decrease. Those who do not work on their restricted day may compensate 
by working longer hours on non-restricted days; therefore, it is important to check 
whether intensive margin changes undo some or all of the extensive margin effects. 
 
37 Population data according to The China Urban Statistic Yearbook 2009, China Statistics Press. These 
calculations assume all Beijing residents have access to a TV. There were 134 color TVs per 100 
households in Beijing in 2008 according to Beijing Statistics Yearbook 2009, China Statistics Press. 
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During the OneDay69 period, viewership is not significantly different outside the 
restricted hours. During the OneDay78 period, viewership increases in both the 
evening and morning hours. While not the only possibilities, this could be due to 
decreased auto congestion or a less-than-perfect correspondence between regular 
work hours and restricted hours (i.e., regular work hours of “self-employed” would 
have exceeded the restricted hours had they not stayed home on their restricted day). 
 
The intensive margin effects do not offset those on the extensive margin and the 
increased commute costs under the driving restrictions decrease total work hours. In 
total, the OneDay69 policy increases TV viewing by 165.2 thousand person-hours and 
the OneDay78 policy by 279.6 thousand.38 Our estimates overstate the effects on 
work time if TV viewing became more attractive relative to other leisure during the 
policy periods. However, it is more likely that we understate the effects because 
increased commute costs increase other leisure activities besides TV watching. Our 
results imply that overall output fell unless productivity increased during the fewer 
hours not spent watching TV. Productivity may also be lower due to reduced social 
interactions in the workplace (see Arnott, 2007; Arnott, Rave, and Schöb, 2005). 
 
Effect on Viewership by Workers with Fixed Work Times: Columns 3 and 4 display 
the results for “hourly workers.” Consistent with predictions for the extensive margin 
(Implication 1), viewership is unaffected during the restricted hours of both the 
OneDay69 and OneDay78 periods. The point estimates are “tight zeroes” – they are 
not due to lack of variation in the data. These workers, having no discretion, must 
commute to work despite the restrictions and their leisure during work hours is 
unaffected. The results for the control variables in the “hourly workers” equation are 
similar to those for “self-employed” except that viewership is less persistent, is 
significantly lower on warmer days, and displays a greater differential on weekends 
and holidays. Viewership is higher during the OddEven period as it was for “self-
employed,” though the magnitude is smaller. 
 
Theory is ambiguous about viewership changes on the intensive margin. Work day 
length will not be affected given fixed work times, but leisure time may decrease or 
increase depending on whether public transit commuting takes more or less time than 
by car. Empirically, we find no significant effect on viewership during OneDay69 
non-restricted hours. For OneDay78, viewership increases 8.9% in the morning hours. 
 
38 For OneDay69 this equals 11.0 thousand additional viewers for 15 restricted hours. For OneDay78 
this equals the sum of 14.9 thousand additional viewers for 13 restricted hours, 15.3 thousand for 4 
evening hours, and 3.4 thousand for 7 morning hours.  
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Although this is a large percentage increase, it represents only 2.1 thousand additional 
viewers given the low viewership in morning hours. Viewership also increases by 
4.0% in the evening hours. While not the only possibilities, this increase is consistent 
with lower auto congestion on non-restricted days allowing workers extra leisure time 
or shorter public transit than auto commute times on restricted days. 
 
Robustness and Alternative Explanations: Appendix G shows the impact of the time 
trend on estimates of the policy/restricted-hours interaction coefficients. The top panel 
shows that for “self-employed,” the coefficients on both the OneDay69 and 
OneDay78 interactions are positive and highly statistically significant. The effect of 
the time trend is in identifying the magnitude of the effect but the coefficients are 
quite stable at a 2nd-order time trend or higher.39 In contrast, the “hourly worker” 
interaction effects, shown in the bottom panel, are small, inconsistent, and with two 
exceptions insignificant beginning with the 4th-order time trend. 
 
To ensure robustness to the grouping of hours into restricted, non-restricted morning, 
and non-restricted evening hours; we re-estimated Equation (3) but interacted the 
OneDay69 and OneDay78 policy variables each separately with 24 hourly dummies 
for a total of 48 interactions. The results confirm our main estimates. Appendix H, 
Panel A plots the coefficients on the interaction terms between OneDay69 and the 24 
hourly dummies for the “self-employed” category. Coefficients are plotted along the 
x-axis only if they are significant at the 10% level or better and the vertical lines 
demarcate the restriction period. Viewership is higher for eleven of the fifteen 
restricted hours relative to before the policy and all eleven are significant at the 5% 
level or better.40 The decrease in the first restricted hour (6:00 – 7:00 a.m.) is 
consistent with workers shifting their commute earlier to comply with the restrictions. 
 
Panel B graphs the coefficients on the interaction terms between OneDay69 and the 
24 hourly dummies for the “hourly workers” category in the same format. The results 
again confirm our main estimates. Viewership is largely unaffected during the 
restricted period with only five of the thirteen hours showing an increase. There is 
also a decrease in the first hour of the restrictions (6:00 – 7:00 a.m.) consistent with 
workers shifting their morning commute earlier to comply with the restrictions. 
 
39 More than a 7th-order time trend created collinearities between the time trend and control variables. 
40 Although the four significant effects in the early morning hours are large in percentage they are small 
in absolute terms. The average decrease from midnight to 4:00 a.m. is 4.0 thousand viewers per hour. 
The effect on absolute viewership is much greater during the restricted hours. The average increase 
from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. is 12.8 thousand viewers per hour. These magnitudes are very similar to 
the average effects in the three time-segment model in Table 6. 
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Although we do not display them for brevity, the results for the interaction terms 
between OneDay78 and the hourly dummies are qualitatively similar although 
stronger. For “self-employed,” viewership is significantly higher during all thirteen 
restricted hours and all are significant at the 1% level or better. For “hourly workers” 
viewership is not significantly different during any restricted hour. 
 
Alternative explanations need to be consistent with the differing policy effects that we 
find for those with and without discretionary work time. This excludes greater subway 
capacity which would directly decrease public transit commute times and indirectly 
decrease auto commute times as commuters substitute from buses, taxis, or private 
cars to subways. While this could partially explain our pollution results, it is 
inconsistent with our intra-day viewership results. First, it conflicts with the increased 
viewership by the self-employed during restricted hours. Quicker auto and public 
transit commute times should stimulate daily labor supply. Second, shorter commute 
times should increase leisure time in non-restricted hours for both groups of workers 
(Appendix D shows this formally). While it does so for “self-employed” it does so for 
“hourly workers” only during the OneDay78 policy and only to a small degree. 
 
An alternative interpretation, rather than explanation, of our findings is that employers 
compensated those with fixed work times for the increased commute costs caused by 
the restrictions while self-employed were unable to adjust market prices for their 
output to do so. While our theory model relies on lumpiness in labor supply (those 
without discretion must work either 40 or 0 hours), this would substitute a story of 
differences in labor- and product-market demand elasticities. 
 
7. Reasons for Effectiveness 
The only other systematic economic evaluation of driving restrictions is Davis (2008), 
which examines a similar one-day-per-week driving restriction in Mexico City. The 
study finds no effect from the restrictions, even in the short run, primarily because it 
stimulated an increase in the number of vehicles in use and a shift toward a greater 
proportion of high-emissions, used vehicles. In this section we offer reasons why the 
policy may have worked in Beijing. Most are speculative but we offer detailed 
evidence of high compliance in Beijing. 
 
Both of the reasons that Davis (2008) cites for the failure of the policy in Mexico City 
are probably less relevant in Beijing. Although auto ownership is increasing quickly 
in Beijing, its cost still represents a significant fraction of income for most Beijing 
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residents. In 2008, the average annual salary in Beijing was RMB 44,715 (USD 6,800) 
compared to USD 25,258 in Mexico City.41 Therefore, purchasing a first vehicle in 
response to the reduced auto congestion created by the restrictions might be 
prohibitive. Also, since cars are not easily divisible (sharing is difficult), purchasing a 
second vehicle with a different plate number to satisfy the restrictions is expensive. 
 
When cars are added in Beijing, they are also likely to be newer, lower-emissions 
vehicles. The number of vehicles in Beijing increased rapidly from 62 million in 1992 
to 344 million in 2008.42 This implies a younger auto stock compared to more 
developed countries where car ownership is a less recent phenomenon. Cars remain 
less prevalent in China than in developed countries. As of 2007, China had 24 cars per 
thousand people compared to 787 in the U.S. and 211 in Mexico.43 This means 
cheaper, higher-emissions used cars are not as readily available, especially given 
Beijing’s emissions standards for new vehicles. 
 
Although our viewership results rule out Beijing’s increase in public transit capacity 
as an explanation for our pollution results, it may play a complementary role. Greater 
capacity may have provided workers with better commuting options thereby lowering 
the cost of complying and limiting the labor supply decrease. 
 
Compliance Evidence: Our pollution results are consistent with high compliance. It is 
uncertain whether compliance differences might explain the different findings in 
Beijing and Mexico City. Davis (2008) argues that penalties and monitoring in 
Mexico City are high but does not provide direct compliance evidence. In this section 
we present detailed evidence of high compliance in Beijing. Detection in Beijing can 
occur by any of 2,215 traffic surveillance cameras (one for every 7.7 square 
kilometers) or by one of about five thousand police officers directing traffic. Annually, 
the first violation triggers a loss of approximately RMB 595 (about USD 90), 
including an immediate fine and loss of several fee waivers. Subsequent violations 
incur a fine of RMB 100 (about USD 15). Violators also incur time costs and possibly 
psychic costs (Appendix I provides more detail on penalties and detection). 
 
 
41 Beijing data from “A Survey Report on Daily Time Allocation of Beijing Residents in 2008,” 
Beijing Statistics Bureau (2009) (in Chinese) and Mexico City from http://mexico-city.co.tv/. 
42 Data from “Independent Environmental Assessment: Beijing 2008 Olympic Games,” United Nations 
Environment Programme, February 2009 (page 42). 
43 Based on “Urban Population, Development and the Environment,” United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Publication #ST/ESA/SERA/274 (2008). 
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To test the extent to which the penalties and detection probability ensure compliance, 
we obtained entrance records for a parking garage located within Beijing’s 4th Ring 
Road. The garage serves a mall and office tower so that parkers are a mix of shoppers 
and workers. The police require that all Beijing garages record the entrance time to 
the minute and license plate of each entering car; however, they are not required to 
take any action against violators of the restrictions. We obtained one week’s worth of 
data (June 27 to July 3, 2010) chosen at random among weeks not containing holidays 
or government meetings that might alter traffic. The garage’s document retention 
policy prevented us from taking a sample within the time period of our main data.44 
 
We divide the week’s hours into three categories: restricted weekday, non-restricted 
weekday, and weekend (non-restricted). The sample week occurred during OneDay78 
so we sampled restricted hours from weekday hours between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. 
and non-restricted hours from weekdays between 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. We avoided 
sampling data from 6:00 – 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 – 9:00 p.m. because commuting from 
the 5th Ring Road to the inner part of Beijing can take up to one hour and therefore 
these hours could contain a mixture of restricted and non-restricted activity. 
 
Since we do not know whether this garage represents Beijing traffic more generally, 
we only make within-garage comparisons. Weekend activity, when no drivers are 
restricted, should closely represent the plate number distribution absent restrictions. 
Although weekend driving may increase overall as drivers substitute from restricted 
weekdays, we expect this is fairly uniform across plate numbers. Therefore, we use 
the weekend as the expected distribution of plate numbers. We compare this expected 
distribution to the observed distribution during weekday restricted and weekday non-
restricted periods. We discuss the regular (hourly) parking results first. 
 
Our expected distribution contains 5,975 observations with at least 83 observations 
for each plate number, thus avoiding any small-sample issues. Figure 3 shows the 
expected distribution of plate numbers. The distribution is far from uniform because 
drivers can pay extra to choose a plate number. The number “4” is least popular as it 
is considered unlucky, while the number “9” is most popular because it is considered 
lucky. To check compliance, we can compare this expected distribution to each 
weekday’s observed distribution. 
 
 
44 Therefore the sample is not necessarily representative of the plate number distribution during the 
time period of our pollution and viewership data. In particular, over time drivers may have sought out 
less common plate numbers to avoid congestion. 
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We first compare the expected distribution to that observed during weekday restricted 
hours. For illustration, Figure 4 compares the expected (weekend) distribution to the 
observed distribution on Tuesday when plates “2” and “7” are restricted. The two 
restricted plates appear much less frequently than on the weekend and the other plates 
appear more frequently.45 Appendix J analyzes data for all five weekdays and applies 
formal statistical tests. Overall, compliance with the driving restrictions is high. Of 
the ten restricted plate numbers during the week, eight are not significantly different 
from zero. Only plates “8,” restricted on Wednesday, and “9,” restricted on Friday, 
are significantly different from zero and only in proportions of 2.7% and 2.4% and at 
significance levels of 7.3% and 8.3%. A few cars entered the garage with no license 
plate – likely a method for avoiding detection by camera. However, their number was 
small, not exceeding 1.3% on any of the five days. Since the garage serves primarily 
professional businesses and an upscale mall we may understate compliance to the 
extent that the parkers are high income and less sensitive to penalties. 
 
There is little evidence of inter-temporal substitution across weekdays. Only four of 
the forty non-restricted plates occur in a proportion greater than expected. Thus, 
drivers do not seem to compensate by driving more on non-restricted days. To check 
for intra-day substitution, we also compared the expected distribution to that for non-
restricted weekday hours. Of the fifty combinations of day/plate numbers, only five 
occur in greater proportion than expected and only one (“2” on Tuesday) is restricted. 
Therefore, we find little evidence of intra-day substitution.46 
 
The parking data separately identify monthly pass holders. The expected (weekend) 
distribution contains only 168 observations but there is much more data on weekdays, 
consistent with this group containing mostly workers. Compliance is also high among 
this group. Of the ten restricted plates none of them are statistically different from 
zero. As with regular parkers, we find little evidence of inter-temporal substitution 
across weekdays. Of the forty non-restricted plate/day observations, only six appear in 
significantly greater proportion than expected. There was insufficient data on monthly 
pass holders during non-restricted, weekday hours to perform statistical tests. 
 
8. Conclusion 
We find a significant pollution reduction due to Beijing’s driving restrictions. We 
 
45 Figure 4 does not control for the fact that plates “2” and “7” should not occur under perfect 
compliance. Our detailed analysis in Appendix J does so. 
46 We cannot test for substitution to weekends because we cannot measure activity “but for” the 
restrictions. 
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identify the drop both inter-temporally and spatially, with larger drops at monitoring 
stations that are closer to major roads. Our spatial tests improve upon previous 
analyses by ruling out coincident policies unrelated to driving. Since most cities that 
monitor air pollution collect data from multiple locations to ensure representativeness, 
our approach can be used in other settings to improve identification of any policy 
change that can be related to stationary pollution sources. 
 
We also devise a novel approach to overcome data limitations in measuring the effect 
of the driving restrictions on labor supply – measuring substitution to TV viewership. 
On average, workers with discretion over their work time increase their viewership 
during restricted hours, consistent with reduced work time due to higher commute 
costs. For workers with fixed work times, on the other hand, we find no significant 
effect. Since factors that reduce both auto and public transit congestion, such as 
expanded subway capacity, would increase TV viewership for all kinds of workers, 
we can also eliminate these as explaining the pollution reduction. 
 
To explain the effectiveness of the driving restrictions we provide evidence that 
compliance is high and that inter-temporal substitution of driving is limited. We find 
only a minor degree of substitution to weekends and the parking garage data reveal no 
intra- or inter-day substitution. We conclude that driving restrictions can be effective 
in reducing pollution but at the cost of reduced work time. These are short-run effects. 
As incomes in China increase, demand for driving will increase and so will the 
number of cars.47 Thus, to keep auto pollution levels constant may require further 
increases in driving costs (e.g., by restricting driving more than one day per week). To 
the extent that sharing vehicles is costly, this will keep average driving costs high and 
reduce the equilibrium number of cars. As our results indicate, one cost of this would 
be further decreases in work time. 
 
Although effective, the restrictions are not the most economically efficient way to 
reduce pollution. The restrictions arbitrarily reduce demand based on the last digit of a 
driver’s license plate regardless of willingness to pay for driving. A more efficient 
allocation would result from increasing vehicle license fees. We provide rough 
calculations of the necessary increase in fees to accomplish an equivalent pollution 
reduction. Beijing has moved in this direction, beginning to limit the number of new 
 
47 Duranton and Turner (2009) provide empirical evidence that a fundamental law of auto congestion 
holds, in which a natural level of congestion is reached in the long run which equates driving demand 
and average cost of commuting as determined by road capacity. 
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car registrations in December 2010; however, it is too early to tell how binding the 
restrictions will be. 
 
Bibliography 
Andrews, S. Q. (2008). “Inconsistencies in Air Quality Metrics: ‘Blue Sky’ Days and 
PM10 Concentrations in Beijing,” Environmental Research Letters, 3, 1 – 14. 
Angrist, J. D. and J. Pischke (2009). Mostly Harmless Econometrics. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 
Arnott, R. (2007). “Congestion Tolling with Agglomeration Externalities,” Journal of 
Urban Economics, 62, 187-203. 
Arnott, R. and M. Kraus (2003). “Principles of Transport Economics,” in Randolph W. 
Hall, ed., Handbook of Transportation Science, 2nd ed., Kluwer Academic, 
689-726. 
Arnott, R., T. Rave, and R. Schöb (2005). Alleviating Urban Traffic Congestion, The 
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Black, D. A., N. Kolesnikova, and L. J. Taylor (2010). “Why Do So Few Women 
Work in New York (And So Many in Minneapolis)? Labor Supply of Married 
Women across U.S. Cities,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper 
#2007-043F. 
Cambridge Systematics, Inc. (2007). “Congestion Mitigation Commission Technical 
Analysis: License Plate Rationing Evaluation,” memorandum. 
Chay, K. Y. and M. Greenstone (2003). “The Impact of Air Pollution on Infant 
Mortality: Evidence from Geographic Variation in Pollution Shocks Induced 
by a Recession,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 1121 – 1167. 
Chen, Y., G. Z. Jin, N. Kumar, and G. Shi (2011). “The Promise of Beijing: 
Evaluating the Impact of the 2008 Olympic Games on Air Quality,” NBER 
Working Paper #16907. 
Cheung, K. and E. Thomson (2004). “The Demand for Gasoline in China: a 
Cointegration Analysis,” Journal of Applied Statistics, 31, 533 – 544. 
Cropper, M. L., Y. Jiang, A. Ablerini, and P. Baur (2010). “Getting Cars off the Road: 
The Cost-Effectiveness of an Episodic Pollution Control Program,” Resources 
for the Future Discussion Paper #10-25. 
Cui, C., L. Lei, X. Deng, and L. Guo (2009). “Research on Transport Policy Effect for 
TECC – Dynamic Calculation Model Based on TEPCC,” Transport 
Standardization, 211, 84 – 86 (in Chinese). 
Currie, J. and M. Neidell (2005). “Air Pollution and Infant Health: What Can We 
Learn from California's Recent Experience?” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 120, 1003 – 1030. 
Davis, L. W. (2008). “The Effect of Driving Restrictions on Air Quality in Mexico 
City,” Journal of Political Economy, 116, 38 – 81. 
Deng, H. and A. C. Ma (2010). “Market Structure and Pricing Strategy of China’s 
Automobile Industry,” The Journal of Industrial Economics, 58, 818 – 845. 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
 
Dong, X., D. Liu, Y. Yuang, and R. Che (2008). “Distribution Characteristics of 
Extractable Organic Matter in Atmospheric PM10 in Beijing,” Geoscience, 22, 
325 – 332 (in Chinese). 
Duranton, G. and M. A. Turner (2011). “The Fundamental Law of Road Congestion: 
Evidence from US Cities,” American Economic Review, forthcoming. 
Eskeland, G. S. and T. Feyzioglu (1995). “Rationing Can Backfire: The ‘Day without 
a Car” in Mexico City,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper #1554. 
Gibbons, S. and S. Machin (2006). “Transport and Labour Market Linkages: 
Empirical Evidence, Implications for Policy and Scope for Further UK 
Research,” Working Paper. 
Goettler, R. and R. Shachar (2001). “Spatial Competition in the Network Television 
Industry,” RAND Journal of Economics, 32, 624 – 656. 
Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau, E. and J. N. van Ommeren (2009). “Labour Supply and 
Commuting: Implications for Optimal Road Taxes,” Tinbergen Institute 
Discussion Paper #TI 2009-008/3. 
Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau, E. and J. N. van Ommeren (2010). “Labour Supply and 
Commuting,” Journal of Urban Economics, 68, 82 – 89. 
Hao, J., L. Wang, L. Li, J. Hu, and X. Yu (2005). “An Analysis of Air Pollutant 
Contributors in Beijing and Alleviation Strategies,” Science in China Series D 
Earth Sciences, 35, 115 – 122 (in Chinese). 
Mahendra, A. (2008). “Vehicle Restrictions in Four Latin American Cities: Is 
Congestion Pricing Possible?” Transport Review, 28, 105 – 133. 
Matus, K. et al. (2011). “Health Damages from Air Pollution in China,” MIT Joint 
Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change Report No. 196. 
Osakwe, R. (2010). “An Analysis of the Driving Restriction Implemented in San José, 
Costa Rica,” Environment for Development Policy Brief. 
Salas, C. (2010). “Evaluating Public Policies with High Frequency Data: Evidence for 
Driving Restrictions in Mexico City Revisited,” Catholic University of Chile 
Working Paper No. 374. 
Small, K. and E. Verhoef (2007). The Economics of Urban Transportation, Routledge, 
New York. 
Wiedensohler, A., et al. (2007). “Secondary Particle Formation and Growth of 
Nucleated Particle into the CCN Size Range in a Polluted Region of North-
Eastern China,” in Leibniz Institute for Tropospheric Research, Biennial 
Report 2006 – 2007, 63 – 65. 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) (2001). “National Air Pollutant 
Emission Trends, 1990 – 1998,” EPA-454/R-00-002, March 2000. 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) (2009). “Air Quality Index: A 
Guide to Air Quality and Your Health,” EPA-456/F-09-002, August 2009. 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) (2010). “Air Pollution Control 
Orientation Course,” accessed at http://www.epa.gov/apti/course422/. 
 
 
Figure 1 Timeline of Pollution-Reduction Policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
09/28/09Subway Line 46
Present04/11/09OneDay78
04/10/0910/11/08OneDay69
10/09/08Subway Line 85
09/20/0807/20/08Factory Closures
08/24/0808/08/08Olympic Games
07/19/08Subway Line 10/Airport4
09/20/0807/20/08OddEven
07/10/07Subway Line 53
01/10/07Subway Fare2
01/01/07Bus Fare1
1 Bus fares reduced from RMB 1 per trip to 0.4 for regular bus pass holders and to 0.2 for student pass holders. On January 15, 2008 an 
additional reduction on suburban routes went into effect – fares were lowered by 60% for adults and by 80% for students. “Suburban” routes 
connect the ten districts and counties outside the inner city with the eight city districts inside. 2 Subway fares reduced from RMB 2 per 
transfer to RMB 2 per trip regardless of number of transfers. 3 Subway Line 5 runs south to north. 4 Subway Line 10 runs southeast to 
northwest including the airport. 5 Subway Line 8 serves the Olympics Park area. It had been opened on a more limited basis earlier to serve 
Olympic athletes and tourists. 6 Subway Line 4 runs south to northwest. 
 
 
Figure 2 Map of Beijing Traffic Restrictions and Monitoring Station Locations in 2008 
and 2009 
 
 
Map shows the locations of the monitoring stations (represented by triangles) within or close to the 6th Ring Road (additional stations are 
located outside the 6th Ring Road). The dashed lines are subway lines. The solid lines are the Ring Roads. The inner-most solid line (which 
partially overlaps with a subway line) is the 2nd Ring Road and expanding out from there are the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Ring Roads. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Expected (Weekend) Distribution of License Plate Numbers 
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Ending license plate numbers of autos entering a Beijing parking garage inside the 4th Ring Road on June 27 
(Sunday) and July 3 (Saturday), 2010 collected by authors. 
 
 
Figure 4 Expected (Weekend) versus Observed (Tuesday) Distribution of License Plate 
Numbers 
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Ending license plate numbers of autos entering a Beijing parking garage inside the 4th Ring Road collected by 
authors. Expected distribution based on June 27 (Sunday) and July 3 (Saturday), 2010. Observed distribution 
based on Tuesday, June 29, 2010 between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. Plates “2” and “7” were 
restricted on Tuesday. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
    Variable N Mean
Standard 
Deviation Min Max
Daily Aggregate Pollution Data
Aggregate API 1,096 90.834 49.527 12.000 500.000
Log(Aggregate API) 1,096 4.392 0.486 2.485 6.215
PM10 917 146.652 79.097 18.000 600.000
Log(PM10) 917 4.867 0.482 2.890 6.397
OddEven 1,096 0.075 0.263 0.000 1.000
OneDay 1,096 0.408 0.492 0.000 1.000
OneDay69 1,096 0.166 0.372 0.000 1.000
OneDay78 1,096 0.242 0.428 0.000 1.000
Olympics 1,096 0.016 0.124 0.000 1.000
Weekend 1,096 0.259 0.438 0.000 1.000
Holiday 1,096 0.071 0.257 0.000 1.000
Maximum Temperature 1,096 18.896 11.144 -6.900 39.600
Average Humidity 1,096 52.527 20.271 11.000 97.000
Total Rainfall 1,096 24.014 85.061 0.000 327.000
Sunshine 1,096 6.619 3.974 0.000 14.000
Wind Direction - Northeast 1,096 0.243 0.429 0.000 1.000
Wind Direction - Southeast 1,096 0.168 0.374 0.000 1.000
Wind Direction - Southwest 1,096 0.376 0.485 0.000 1.000
Wind Direction - Northwest 1,096 0.214 0.410 0.000 1.000
Max. Wind Speed - 1st Quartile 1,096 0.253 0.435 0.000 1.000
Max. Wind Speed - 2nd Quartile 1,096 0.249 0.433 0.000 1.000
Max. Wind Speed - 3rd Quartile 1,096 0.255 0.436 0.000 1.000
Max. Wind Speed - 4th Quartile 1,096 0.243 0.429 0.000 1.000
Daily Station-Level Pollution Data
Station-Level API 25,482 90.227 50.751 6.000 500.000
Log(Station-Level API) 25,482 4.375 0.512 1.792 6.215
Station-Level Data
Distance from Ring Road 24 8.210 11.884 0.406 38.578
Distance from Ring Road (w/i 4th Ring Road) 8 0.831 0.264 0.406 1.280
Viewership Data
"Self-Employed" Viewership (thousands) 26,304 91 76 0 480
"Self-Employed" Log(thousands viewers) 26,304 4.042 1.179 0.000 6.176
"Salaried Workers" Viewership (thousands) 26,304 149 129 0 652
"Salaried Workers" Log(thousands viewers) 26,304 4.377 1.445 0.000 6.482
Total Rainfall 26,304 24.014 85.024 0.000 327.000
Average Wind Speed 26,304 2.212 0.915 0.500 6.700
Sunshine 26,304 6.619 3.972 0.000 14.000
Average Temperature 26,304 13.600 10.976 -9.400 31.600
Weekend 26,304 0.285 0.451 0.000 1.000
Holiday 26,304 0.071 0.257 0.000 1.000
Olympics 26,304 0.016 0.124 0.000 1.000
OddEven 26,304 0.075 0.263 0.000 1.000
OneDay69 26,304 0.166 0.372 0.000 1.000
OneDay78 26,304 0.242 0.428 0.000 1.000
See Appendix E for a description of the variables and their sources.  
 
Table 2 Relationship between API and PM10 
API PM10 Conversion Formula
0 – 50 0 – 50 API = PM10
50 – 200 50 – 350 API = (1/2)*PM10 + 25
200 – 300 350 – 420 API = (10/7)*PM10 – 300
300 – 400 420 – 500 API = (5/4)*PM10 – 225
400 – 500 500 – 600 API = PM10 – 100
Based on Andrews (2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Effect of Driving Restrictions on Log Aggregate Beijing Daily API (2007 – 
2009), N = 1,095 
Constant 3.0240 *** 3.0069 *** 3.0370 *** 3.0223 ***
(0.1451) (0.1475) (0.1489) (0.1446)
Lagged Log API 0.3124 *** 0.3127 *** 0.3114 *** 0.3123 ***
(0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0300)
OddEven -0.1928 *** -0.2174 *** -0.2068 *** -0.1946 ***
(0.0436) (0.0497) (0.0512) (0.0447)
OneDay -0.0793 *** -0.1308 ** -0.1481 **
(0.0273) (0.0583) (0.0591)
OneDay*Weekend 0.0968 ** (0.0967) ** (0.0965) ** 0.0968 **
(0.0460) (0.0458) (0.0460) (0.0460)
OneDay69 -0.0735 **
(0.0332)
OneDay78 -0.0833 **
(0.0334)
Olympics -0.2105 *** -0.2109 *** -0.2107 *** -0.2107 ***
(0.0807) (0.0805) (0.0805) (0.0808)
Weekend -0.0843 *** -0.0839 *** -0.0837 *** -0.0843 ***
(0.0312) (0.0310) (0.0311) (0.0312)
Holiday -0.0745 -0.0775 -0.0774 -0.0745
(0.0485) (0.0485) (0.0489) (0.0484)
Maximum Temperature 0.0483 *** 0.0489 *** 0.0491 *** 0.0483 ***
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036)
Average Humidity 0.0050 *** 0.0050 *** 0.0050 *** 0.0050 ***
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Total Rainfall -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Sunshine -0.0326 *** -0.0327 *** -0.0328 *** -0.0326 ***
(0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0041)
Wind Direction - Southeast 0.0117 0.0135 0.0157 0.0110
(0.0512) (0.0512) (0.0512) (0.0514)
Wind Direction - Southwest 0.0300 0.0309 0.0323 0.0295
(0.0416) (0.0417) (0.0417) (0.0418)
Wind Direction - Northwest -0.1809 -0.1819 -0.1736 -0.1822
(0.1414) (0.1406) (0.1414) (0.1422)
Max. Wind Speed - 2nd Quartile -0.1955 *** -0.2003 *** -0.1990 *** -0.1950 ***
(0.0626) (0.0628) (0.0630) (0.0625)
Max. Wind Speed - 3rd Quartile -0.2260 *** -0.2288 *** -0.2275 *** -0.2260 ***
(0.0575) (0.0574) (0.0574) (0.0575)
Max. Wind Speed - 4th Quartile -0.0006 -0.0034 0.0025 -0.0010
(0.0633) (0.0632) (0.0637) (0.0635)
Adjusted R2
Prob > F (Time Trend)
0.5023
Dependent variable is log of aggregate, daily API. Standard errors in parentheses. Newey-West 
standard errors with one-day lag used in all regressions. * = 10% significance, ** = 5% 
significance, *** = 1% significance. Month dummies and interactions between wind speed and 
wind direction included in all regressions. A linear time trend is included in Model 2 and a 
quadratic time trend in Model 3. The F-test is the joint significance level of the time trend 
variables.
OneDay69Quadratic
Baseline Trend
0.5017
25.6 34.6
vs. OneDay78Trend
Linear
0.5011 0.5011
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Effect of Driving Restrictions on Aggregate Daily Pollution Levels (2007 – 
2009) 
Constant 3.0240 *** 3.5581 *** 3.5957 ***
(0.1451) (0.1263) (0.1406)
Lagged Log API (PM10) 0.3124 *** 0.2456 *** 0.2839 ***
(0.0300) (0.0255) (0.0238)
OddEven -0.1928 *** -0.1887 *** -0.2515 ***
(0.0436) (0.0322) (0.0468)
OneDay -0.0793 *** -0.0877 *** -0.1045 ***
(0.0273) (0.0234) (0.0294)
OneDay*Weekend 0.0968 ** 0.0499 0.0749
(0.0460) (0.0384) (0.0540)
Olympics -0.2105 *** -0.0181 -0.1326 *
(0.0807) (0.0625) (0.0790)
Weekend -0.0843 *** -0.0719 *** -0.1198 ***
(0.0312) (0.0260) (0.0348)
Holiday -0.0745 -0.0364 -0.0769
(0.0485) (0.0380) (0.0523)
Maximum Temperature 0.0483 *** 0.0319 *** 0.0480 ***
(0.0036) (0.0033) (0.0040)
Average Humidity 0.0050 *** 0.0025 *** 0.0044 ***
(0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0011)
Total Rainfall -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Sunshine -0.0326 *** -0.0254 *** -0.0371 ***
(0.0041) (0.0033) (0.0044)
Blue Sky -0.7518 ***
(0.0555)
Blue Sky*OddEven 0.2385 ***
(0.0738)
Blue Sky*OneDay 0.0787
(0.0682)
SO2 -0.2905 ***
(0.0705)
SO2*OneDay 0.0984
(0.0905)
Adjusted R2
N
Log(API)
1,095 9161,095
0.5011 0.6722 0.4742
Standard errors in parentheses. For Models 1 and 2, Newey-West standard errors with one-
day lag are used. * = 10% significance, ** = 5% significance, *** = 1% significance. 
Month dummies, wind speed, wind direction, and interactions between wind speed and 
wind direction included in all regressions.
Log(PM10)Baseline Blue Sky/SO2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Effect of Driving Restrictions on Log Daily API at Beijing Monitoring 
Stations, Fixed Effects Estimates (2007 – 2009) 
Constant 2.9908 *** 2.9566 *** 2.9572 ***
(0.0198) (0.0162) (0.0168)
Lagged Log API 0.3227 *** 0.3138 *** 0.3134 ***
(0.0047) (0.0035) (0.0036)
OddEven -0.1823 *** -0.2063 *** -0.3186 ***
(0.0088) (0.0223) (0.0297)
OddEven*Distance 0.0911 *** 0.3824 ***
(0.0291) (0.0687)
OddEven*Distance2 -0.1726 ***
(0.0384)
OneDay -0.1474 *** -0.0884 *** -0.1939 ***
(0.0097) (0.0226) (0.0273)
OneDay*Distance 0.0578 ** 0.3310 ***
(0.0285) (0.0690)
OneDay*Distance2 -0.1620 ***
(0.0404)
OneDay*Weekend 0.0690 *** 0.0782 *** 0.0782 ***
(0.0039) (0.0053) (0.0053)
Olympics -0.2244 *** -0.2166 *** -0.2166 ***
(0.0088) (0.0173) (0.0173)
Weekend -0.0587 *** -0.0678 *** -0.0677 ***
(0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0037)
Holiday -0.0738 *** -0.0642 *** -0.0643 ***
(0.0034) (0.0077) (0.0077)
Maximum Temperature 0.0481 *** 0.0494 *** 0.0494 ***
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Average Humidity 0.0045 *** 0.0049 *** 0.0049 ***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Total Rainfall 0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Sunshine -0.0328 *** -0.0307 *** -0.0307 ***
(0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Adjusted R2
Number of Stations
N
Stations within 4th Ring Road
Dependent variable is log of daily API at monitoring stations. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the station level in parentheses. * = 10% 
significance, ** = 5% significance, *** = 1% significance. Month 
dummies, wind speed quartiles, wind direction dummies, interactions 
between wind speed and wind direction included in all regressions. A 
quadratic time trend included in Model 1 and a cubic time trend in 
Models 2 and 3.
25,390 8,319 8,319
0.4952
24 8
All
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Table 6 Effect of Driving Restrictions on Log Hourly Television Viewership (2007 – 
2009), N = 26,303 
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Lagged Viewership 0.5507 (0.0081) *** 0.4373 (0.0094) ***
Total Rainfall -0.0001 (0.0000) ** -0.0001 (0.0000) **
Average Wind Speed 0.0048 (0.0031) 0.0045 (0.0030)
Sunshine -0.0024 (0.0007) *** -0.0016 (0.0007) **
Average Temperature -0.0009 (0.0009) -0.0020 (0.0009) **
Weekend 0.0183 (0.0080) ** 0.0709 (0.0082) ***
Holiday 0.0487 (0.0125) *** 0.1306 (0.0140) ***
Olympics 0.0971 (0.0196) *** 0.0902 (0.0229) ***
OddEven 0.1157 (0.0153) *** 0.0620 (0.0150) ***
OddEven*Weekend -0.0118 (0.0174) 0.0329 (0.0198) *
OddEven*Holiday -0.0916 (0.0399) ** -0.0640 (0.0422)
OneDay69*Weekend 0.0235 (0.0207) 0.0142 (0.0199)
OneDay69*Holiday 0.0979 (0.0319) *** 0.0060 (0.0379)
OneDay78*Weekend 0.0865 (0.0242) *** 0.0264 (0.0211)
OneDay78*Holiday 0.0718 (0.0389) * -0.0310 (0.0320)
OneDay69*Restr. Hours 0.1079 (0.0164) *** 0.0147 (0.0163)
OneDay69*Non-Restr. Evening Hours 0.0074 (0.0165) -0.0039 (0.0161)
OneDay69*Non-Restr. Morning Hours -0.0533 (0.0355) -0.0066 (0.0312)
OneDay78*Restr. Hours 0.1521 (0.0213) *** -0.0231 (0.0187)
OneDay78*Non-Restr. Evening Hours 0.0761 (0.0206) *** 0.0402 (0.0180) **
OneDay78*Non-Restr. Morning Hours 0.1553 (0.0307) *** 0.0887 (0.0277) ***
R2
Dependent variable is log number of thousands of individuals watching television each hour. 
Newey-West standard errors with four-hour lag in parentheses. * = 10% significance, ** = 5% 
significance, *** = 1% significance. Hour and month dummies and a 7th-order polynomial 
expansion of a daily time trend included in both regressions.
0.8850
"Hourly Workers"
0.9291
"Self-Employed"
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Appendix A 
Labor Supply Model with OddEven Driving Restrictions 
 
Consider two groups of workers: those with discretionary work time (D) and those with fixed work 
times (F) in proportions Dλ  and 1F Dλ λ= −
( )DG θ
 respectively. Assumption (B) in the main text ensures that 
the restrictions do not change these proportions. The distribution of workers in each group is given by 
the cumulative density functions  and  where ( )FG θ { }, , , ,i i iw Y c t Mθ =
)0i =
.  is hourly wage, Y  
is two-day non-wage income, and i  is commute mode. Possible commute modes are auto ( ) , 
public transit ( , and for those with discretion, not working ( . For mode ,  is daily 
commute cost and  time (with ). 
w
i
i A=
)i P=
it
ic
0 0 0t c= = iM  is the worker’s daily non-monetary disutility from 
commuting by mode i . Commuting by either mode is unpleasant: ,P AM M M> 0 0= . A worker’s two-
day utility conditional on commute choices (  for the non-restricted and i j  for the restricted day) is: 
 
(A1) ( ) { }1 1 ; , , ,0
Nij Nij Rij Rijij i j Policy j A
U L X L X M M Q i j A Pα α α αθ − − == − − − Ι Ι ∈ , 
 
with ( . This distinguishes the restricted (  and non-restricted (  days. )10 α< < )R )N L  is daily leisure 
hours and X  daily consumption of other goods. We ignore across-day discounting and assume that 
utility derived from each two-day period is independent of other two-day periods. Ι  is an indicator 
variable equal to one when the condition is true and zero otherwise and  is a logical variable 
distinguishing the policy period.  is expected penalty (monetary and psychic) in utility terms of 
driving a car while restricted. We solve the model by backward induction. 
Policy
Q
 
Second Stage: Discretionary Work Time: Ignoring the penalty Q , the worker’s second-stage problem 
conditional on mode choices i  and j  is: 
 
(A2) 
{ }1 1
, , ,
, ,
M ax ; , , ,0 :
Nij Nij Rij Rijij i j
H L XNij Nij Nij
H L XRij Rij Rij
U L X L X M M i j A P stα α α α− −
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
= − − ∈
 
(A3)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,Nij Rij Nij i Rij jY w H H X c X c+ + − + − + =
(A4a)    (A4b)  ( ) 0,Nij i NijT H t L− + − = ( ) 0,Rij j RijT H t L− + − =
(A5a) ,    (A5b) 0Nij NH κ≥ ← 0Rij RH κ≥ ← ; 
 
where T  is total available hours per day, H  is daily working hours, and the ’s are Kuhn-Tucker 
multipliers. Equation (A3) is the resident’s two-day budget constraint with the price of 
κ
X  normalized 
to one. Equations (A4a) and (A4b) are the resident’s day-by-day time constraints. We assume that the 
budget and time constraints bind but that the constraints on positive working hours may not. 
Substituting (A3) and (A4) the problem becomes: 
 
(A6)  { } ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )11, ,
M ax
Nijij Nij i Rij j Nij Rij Nij i j i jH X HNij Nij Rij
U T H t X T H t Y wH wH X c c M M
α α αα −−= − − − − + + − − − − −
 
The first-order conditions for the worker’s problem are: 
 
(A7a) ( ) ( ) ( )1: ,ij i j ij i jNij
Nij i Nij Rij Nij i j
U M M w U M M
H
T H t Y wH wH X c c
α α+ + − + +⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦ − − + + − − −
 
(A7b) ( ) ( ) ( )1: ,ij i j ij i jRij
Rij j Nij Rij Nij i j
U M M w U M M
H
T H t Y wH wH X c c
α ακ+ + − + +⎡ ⎤ − =⎣ ⎦ − − + + − − −
 
(A8) ( )( ) ( )( )1 1: ,ij i j ij i jNij
Nij Nij Rij Nij i j
U M M U M M
X
X Y wH wH X c c
α α− + + − + +⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦ + + − − −
 
(A9a) [ ] :R Rij RHκ κ = 0 ,    (A9b) [ ] : 0N Nij NHκ κ = . 
 
A1 
FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION 
There are two cases to solve: “full time” { }( ), 0; , ,Nij RijH H i j A P> ∈  and “reduced time” (  0 0,NiH >
{ },i A P∈ ; but  or vice versa). Define, conditional on the commute mode choices  and 0 0RiH = i j : 
 
(A10a) Ni iNT T t= −  and Rj jNT T t= − ,  (A10b) i jij
Y c c
NI
w
− −= ; 
(A10c) ,    (A10d) 
ji j it t tΔ = − ( )ji j ic c ctΔ = − w . 
 
NiNT  and RjNT  are the time available net of commuting on restricted and non-restricted days while  
is the two-day, non-wage income net of commute costs.  and  are the difference in commute 
times and costs respectively on the restricted versus non-restricted days. Both  and  are 
converted to hours based on the opportunity cost of time. 
ijNI
jitΔ jicΔ
ijNI jicΔ
 
Case 1): “Full Time” { }( , 0; , ,Nij Rij )H H i j A P> ∈ . Solving the model (the Optional Appendix contains 
a detailed solution), the results are: 
 
(A11a) ( )1
2Nij Ni ij ji
H NT NI tαα ⎡ ⎤= − − −Δ⎣ ⎦ ,  (A11b) ( )1 2Rij Rj ij jiH NT NI t
αα ⎡ ⎤= − − + Δ⎣ ⎦ ; 
(A12) ( )12Nij Rij Ni ij jiL L NT NI tα ⎡ ⎤= = + −Δ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , 
(A13) ( ) ( )11 2Nij Rij Ni ij jiX X w NT NI tα ⎡ ⎤= = − + −Δ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . 
 
Two-day indirect utility is, where we re-introduce the penalty : Q
 
(A14) ( )( ) 221 ; , 02 2ij jiij Ni i j Policy j ANI tU kw NT M M Q i jα− =Δ⎛ ⎞= + − − − − Ι Ι⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ≠  where . ( )( )( )11k ααα α −= −
 
Leisure time is equated across the days. For workers who prefer public transit the work day lengths are 
the same: . For those who prefer driving, their restricted work day will be shorter or 
longer than their non-restricted depending on whether their public transit commute is longer or shorter 
than by car (
0RPP NPPH H− =
( )1RAP NAP PAH H tα − Δ− = ). 
 
Case 2): “Reduced Time” ( { }0 0, ,NiH i A P> ∈
0R Rt c= =
 but ). We solve the model assuming zero hours 
on the restricted day. In this case . The results for instead working zero hours on the non-
restricted days are symmetric but Appendix B shows that this is not optimal under fairly general 
conditions. Solving (the Optional Appendix contains a detailed solution), the results are: 
0RijH =
 
(A15a) ( ) ( )0 0
2 1
1 1 2Ni Ni i
H NT NIααα
⎡ ⎤= − −⎢ ⎥+ − ⎣ ⎦
, (A15b) ; 0 0RiH =
(A16a) ( ) [0 1 1Ni Ni i ]0L NT NI
α
α= + − +
,  (A16b) 0RiL T= ; 
(A17a) ( )( ) [0 0
1
1 1Ni i i
w
X NT
α
α
−= + − ]NI+ ,  (A17b) 
( )
( ) [ ]0 0
1
1 1Ri i
w
X NT
α
α
−= ++ − iNI
. 
 
Two-day indirect utility is: 
 
(A18) 
( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )
21
1 1
0 01 1
1 1
i Ni i iM− ( )( )( )11k ααα α −= −kwU NT NI Tα α αα αα α
−
+ −
+ −= ++ −
, where . 
 
A2 
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The worker cannot balance leisure or work time across restricted and non-restricted days. The results 
for  but  are obtained by replacing  with 0NijH = 0RijH > N R , i  with , and  with 0 0 j . 
 
Second Stage: Fixed Work Times: Since daily work hours are fixed { }( )0; , ,Nij RijH H H i j A P= = > ∈ , 
the worker chooses only 
NijL , RijL , , and NijX RijX . Solving, (the Optional Appendix contains a detailed 
solution), the results are: 
 
(A19a) 
Nij iL T H t= − − ,    (A19b) Rij jL T H t= − − ; 
(A20) 1
2Nij Rij ij
X X w H NI⎡ ⎤= = +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
 
Two-day indirect utility is, where we re-introduce the penalty : Q
 
(A21) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 12 1 ; , 02 ijij i j i j Policy j ANIU w T H t T H t H M M Q i j
ααα
−
−
=
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤= − − − − + − − − Ι Ι⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠
≠
)
. 
 
The difference in leisure time on restricted versus non-restricted days depends on relative commute 
times for the chosen modes ( Rij Nij jiL L t− = Δ  but the difference is not shared across the two days. 
 
This completes the second-stage solution for type . We now consider the first stage when each 
worker chooses their commute mode. Using the distributions of the ’s we can specify the share of 
each commute mode for both categories of workers: 
θ
θ
{ } { }, , , , ,
ij
ks k D F A P∈ ∈; i j 0 . We solve the first 
stage with and without the restrictions. 
 
First Stage – Without Restrictions: Without the restrictions, the two days are identical and the worker 
makes the same choice across days ( i ). The shares of each mode are ( ) : j= ,k D F=
 
(A22a) ( ) ( ){ } ( )| ; , 0
AA
k k
AA iis U U i P dGθ θ θ θ= > =∫ dθ , (A22b) ( ) ( ){ } ( )| ; , 0PPk kPP iis U U i A dGθ θ θ θ= > = dθ∫ , 
 
where  is given by (A14) and Assumption (A) in the main text implies  so that . 
ijU 00 0
ks = 1
AA PP
k ks s+ =
 
First Stage – With Restrictions: Assumption (D) in the main text ensures that Q  is great enough that 
no workers drive on their restricted day so that { },i A P∈  and { },0j P∈
{ }; ,
. Regardless of whether they 
have discretion or not, commuters who prefer public transit absent the restrictions will take public 
transit both days under the restrictions so that 
PP
k k
PPs s k= ∈ D F
( ) (AAUθ >
?
PP
 where we use hats to denote 
outcomes under the restrictions. This follows because U  implies  in 
both Equations (A14) and (A21). 
)θ ( ) ( )PP APU Uθ θ>
 
Workers who prefer to drive absent the restrictions will continue to drive on the non-restricted day. On 
the restricted day, those with fixed work times must take public transit on the restricted day so that 
 and 
0 0A
F
s =? AP AA
F Fs s=? . On the restricted day, those with discretion can either take public transit or not 
work. The shares doing each are: 
 
(A23a) ( ) ( ){ } ( )0|APD DAP As U U dGθ θ θ θ= >∫? dθ , (A23b) ( ) ( ){ } ( )0 0|AD DA APs U U dGθ θ θ θ= > dθ∫? . 
 
Given Assumption (B) in the main text, we know that 
0AP A AA
D D Ds s s+ =? ?
AP AA
D
 and if some commuters find it 
optimal to stay home when restricted ( )  then 0 0ADs >? Ds s<? . 
 
A3 
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Extensive Margin Effects: For those with fixed work times, there is no effect on the extensive margin 
since they have no control over work time (i.e., 
AP AA
F Fs s=?  and PP PP
F Fs s=? ). This yields Implication 1 in 
the main text. 
 
Assumption (A) implies that absent the restrictions no workers with discretionary work time stay home 
on the restricted day.1 With the restrictions, this increases to 
0 2A
DD sλ ?  – the density of workers 
choosing “reduced time.” This yields Implication 2 in the main text. 
 
Under the restrictions, daily car density and pollution on Beijing roads decreases by ( )12 AA AAD D F Fs sλ λ+ . 
That is, half the drivers cannot drive on a given day. This yields Implication 3 in the main text. 
 
Intensive Margin Effects – Workers with Fixed Work Times: Those who took public transit absent the 
restrictions will still do so and their leisure time is unaffected ? ?( )0NPP RPPNPP RPPL L L L− = − =  by 
Equation (A19). Those who prefer to drive, with density 2
AA
F Fsλ , are forced to take public transit and 
leisure is unaffected on non-restricted  but affected on restricted days ?( 0NAP NAAL L− = )
?( RAP RAAL L− = )PAt−Δ  by Equation (A19). Since intensive margin effects are zero for those who 
normally take public transit and ambiguous for those who normally drive, the total effect ( )2AAF F PAs tλ− Δ  could be positive or negative. This yields Implication 4 in the main text. 
 
Intensive Margin Effects – Workers with Discretionary Work Time: Workers who prefer public 
transit absent the restrictions choose to work “full time” and there is no effect on leisure time: 
? ? 0NPP RPPNPP RPPL L L L− = − =  by Equation (A12). Those who prefer driving absent the restrictions and 
choose to work “full time” must commute by public transit on the restricted day and their leisure time 
could increase or decrease depending on whether public transit commute times and costs are less than 
those by car or not: ? NAPL LNAA− = ? RAP RAAL L− = (2 )PA PAc tα− Δ + Δ  by Equation (A12). 
 
For workers who work “reduced time,” leisure time most likely decreases on the non-restricted day. 
Equations (A12) and (A16a) imply: 
 
(A24) ? ( ) ( )( ) ( )0 1 11 1 2 ANA NAA A
cYL L T t
w w
α αα αα
⎡ ⎤− = − − + + − ≡⎢ ⎥+ − ⎣ ⎦ ϒ
. 
 
That the expression in Equation (A24) can be positive (negative) is most easily seen by setting  close 
to one (zero). This expression is more likely positive the greater Y , , or . The total effect across all 
workers with discretionary work time is 
α
Ac At
( PAc )0 2D DD A APs s tλ α PA⎡ ⎤ϒ− Δ + Δ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦? ?
P
, which could be positive or 
negative. This yields Implication 5 in the main text. 
 
Appendix B 
Non-Optimality of Staying Home on Non-Restricted Day 
 
Working on the restricted day but not on the non-restricted is not optimal under at least two general 
cases: 
 
Case 1: AM M=  and . For a worker who prefers to commute by auto,  which by 
Equation (A14) implies: 
Ac c> P AA PPU U>
 
(B1) ( ) (2 2 2
2 2
AA PP
NA NP P A A P
NI NI )NT NT t t c
w
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ > + ⇒ − > −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ c
                                                
. Now: 
 
1 In our data, this will not literally be zero due to multiple daily work shifts, vacations, and sick days. 
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(B2) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 2 1A P A P A P P A A Pc c c c c c t t c cw w w> ⇒ − < − ⇒ − > − )
0
P P P
 which implies: 
(B3) . This implies 
 using Equation (A18). 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 10 0 0NA A NP P NA A NP PNT NI NT NI NT NI NT NIα α+ − + −+ > + ⇒ + > +
0PU0AU >
 
Case 2:  and  but At t= Ac c= AM M≠ . By Equation (A14) . This implies 
 using Equation (A18). 
AA PP P AU U M M> ⇒ >
0AU > 0PU
 
Assumption (A) in the main text ensures that the worker will remain home on at most the restricted day 
since the non-restricted day is unaffected and extra leisure is already enjoyed on the restricted day 
under “reduced-time” work. 
 
Appendix C 
Conditions for “Reduced-Time” Work for Discretionary Workers 
 
We consider two cases: 
 
Case 1: . Comparing Equations (A14) and (A18),  when: 
 
0A PM M= = 0AU U> AP
(C1) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1 1 10 2
0
1 1 .
2 2
NA A
P PA
NA A
NT NI T
c tNT NI
α α α αα α
+ −
+ −+ > + −Δ⎛ ⎞+ − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
 
It follows immediately that this is more likely the greater Pc  or PAtΔ . 
 
Case2: ( . Since  in Equation (A18) does not depend on )0PM ? 0AU PM  and  in Equation (A14) is 
decreasing in 
APU
PM  it follows directly that  when 0AU U> AP PM  is sufficiently large ( ) . 0PM ?
 
Appendix D 
Effect of Expanded Subway Capacity on Leisure Time 
 
Expanded subway capacity reduces both public transit and auto commute times:  and A At t<? P Pt t<? , 
where tildes indicate outcomes after the expansion. Assume that the expansion has no effect on 
commute costs (  and A Ac c=? P Pc c=? ) and does not change workers’ optimal commute modes. 
Assuming all workers obey the restrictions and continue to work “full time” (i.e., there is no extensive 
margin effect), compute the change in leisure time due to the subway expansion for each category of 
worker and commute mode. For those with discretionary work time who prefer driving and public 
transit respectively (by Equation (A12)): 
 
(D1) ? ? ( ) ( )1 12 2A PNAP RAP A ANAA RAA A Pc cL L L L t t t twα −⎡ ⎤− = − = − + − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦? ? , 
(D2) ? ? ( )NPP RPP PNPP RPP PL L L L t tα− = − = − ? . 
 
For those with fixed work times who prefer driving and public transit respectively (by Equation (A19)): 
 
(D3a) ? (NAP ANAA A )L L t t− = − ? ,   (D3b) ? ( )RAP PRAA AL L t t− = − ? ; 
(D4) ? ? ( )NPP RPP PNPP RPP PL L L L t t− = − = − ? . 
 
All of the expressions on the right-hand sides of Equations (D1) through (D4) are weakly decreasing in 
both  and At? Pt?  and are strictly decreasing in one of them for at least one commute mode within each 
group of workers. This implies that leisure time increases for both groups due to the expansion. 
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Appendix E 
Variable Descriptions and Data Sources 
Frequency/
Variable Description Availability Data Source
Aggregate API Aggregate Air Pollution Index; see text 
for detailed description.
Daily SEPA and BJEPA
Station-Level API Air Pollution Index from 24 monitoring 
stations.
Daily Andrews (2008)
Maximum Temperature Maximum daily temperature in celcius. Daily CMDSSS
Average Humidity Average percent humidity over the day. Daily CMDSSS
Total Rainfall Total rainfall over the day in 
centimeters.
Daily CMDSSS
Wind Direction Predominant direction of wind during 
the day divided into four quadrants 
(Northeast, Southeast, Southwest, 
Northwest).
Daily CMDSSS
Max. Wind Speed Maximum of the average wind speed 
over 15-minute increments across the 
day in meters per second.
Daily CMDSSS
Sunshine Number of total hours of sunlight during 
the day.
Daily CMDSSS
Distance from Ring 
Road
Distance in kilometers of monitoring 
station from nearest Ring Road.
Once Geographic Information System 
calculations
Average Wind Speed Average daily wind speed in meters per 
second.
Daily CMDSSS
Average Temperature Average daily temperature in celsius. Daily CMDSSS
Television Viewership Number of people in thousands watching 
television.
Hourly CSM Media Research Television 
Audience Measurement (TAM)
CMDSSS refers to China Meteorological Data Sharing Service System, SEPA to State Environmental Protection Agency, and 
BJEPA to Beijing Environmental Protection Agency.  
 
Appendix F 
API Discontinuity due to Policies 
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Residuals from estimating Equation (1) in the main text without OE , , , and time trend. 
Moving left to right, the four vertical lines demarcate the beginning and end of the OddEven policy, the 
beginning of OneDay69 policy, and the beginning of OneDay78 policy. The fitted line allows for a 
quadratic time trend along with differing intercepts for the OddEven, OneDay69, and OneDay78 policy 
periods. The fitted line shows a large decrease in the API during the OddEven policy, a commensurate 
increase at its expiration, and then a smaller decrease during the OneDay69 and OneDay78 policy 
periods. The effects for the OneDay69 and OneDay78 policies are indistinguishable. The line also 
reflects a slight upward trend in the API over time (although it is not statistically significant). 
69OD 78OD
FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION 
Appendix G 
Sensitivity of Policy Coefficients to Order of Polynomial Daily Time Trend in 
Regression of Log Hourly Television Viewership, N = 26,303 
"Self-Employed"
OneDay69*Restricted Hours 0.1887 *** 0.1126 *** 0.1020 *** 0.1019 *** 0.1297 *** 0.1099 *** 0.1110 *** 0.1079 ***
(0.0084) (0.0107) (0.0110) (0.0138) (0.0155) (0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0164)
OneDay78*Restricted Hours 0.2708 *** 0.1566 *** 0.1044 *** 0.1043 *** 0.1410 *** 0.1476 *** 0.1488 *** 0.1521 ***
(0.0088) (0.0132) (0.0184) (0.0190) (0.0206) (0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0213)
χ2 (Time Trend) 10.2 60.6 40.6 32.8 28.2 23.5 20.2
"Hourly Workers"
OneDay69*Restricted Hours 0.1058 *** 0.0784 *** 0.0681 *** 0.0589 *** 0.0127 0.0310 ** 0.0236 0.0147
(0.0074) (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0135) (0.0143) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0163)
OneDay78*Restricted Hours 0.1407 *** 0.0994 *** 0.0487 *** 0.0425 ** -0.0185 -0.0246 -0.0326 * -0.0231
(0.0063) (0.0134) (0.0166) (0.0174) (0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0185) (0.0187)
χ2 (Time Trend) 3.6 17.9 12.5 22.0 19.0 18.0 15.6
6-Order
Coefficents on selected policy variables in regression of log viewership on control variables and a polynomial time trend as in Table 6. Dependent 
variable is log number of thousands of individuals watching television each hour.  Newey-West standard errors with four-hour lag in parentheses. * = 
10% significance, ** = 5% significance, *** = 1% significance. All regressions include the control variables shown in Table 6 as well as hour and 
month dummies. The χ2 value is the test statistic for the joint significance of the time trend variables.
7-Order0-Order 1-Order 2-Order 3-Order 4-Order 5-Order
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Appendix H 
Coefficients on Interaction between Policy Variables and Hourly Dummies 
 
Panel A – “Self-Employed” Percentage Difference in Viewership during OneDay69 Period 
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Chart shows coefficients on interactions between the OneDay69 policy variable and hourly dummies in the regression of 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 but with OneDay69 and OneDay78 interacted with each hour separately. Coefficients are shown 
only if significant at the 10% level or better. The vertical dotted lines demarcate the restricted period. 
 
Panel B – “Hourly Workers” Percentage Difference in Viewership during OneDay69 Period 
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Chart shows coefficients on interactions between the OneDay69 policy variable and hourly dummies in the regression of 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 but with OneDay69 and OneDay78 interacted with each hour separately. Coefficients are shown 
only if significant at the 10% level or better. The vertical dotted lines demarcate the restricted period. 
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Appendix I 
Penalties for and Detection of Driving Restrictions Violations 
 
Violation penalties include monetary and time costs and depend on the detection method. Violators are 
immediately fined RMB 100 and incur a time cost because payment requires going to the relevant 
police station for documentation and then to a bank to pay. The latter step can be done online but only 
if the recipient has an account at the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. The driver can delegate 
these tasks to someone with a lower cost of time by loaning them their national identity card. If a police 
officer detects the violation, it must be paid within fifteen days or interest is accrued at RMB 3 per day. 
For violations detected by cameras there is no immediate deadline. Regardless of how detected, the fine 
must be paid before renewal of the vehicle’s bi-annual registration. During our sample period, only one 
penalty could be issued per day.2 
 
A first-time violation would also trigger the loss of several fee waivers. Those complying with the 
OddEven restrictions received a waiver of three months’ vehicle taxes (about RMB 100)3 and highway 
maintenance fees (about RMB 330).4 During the OneDay period the waiver equaled one month’s fees. 
During both the OddEven and OneDay periods, a driver received a discount on auto insurance equal to 
the number of days their car was restricted. Although the precise amount depended on individual 
premiums, the average reduction was RMB 65 during the OneDay69 period.5 
 
Beijing had 1,958 traffic surveillance cameras as of March 31, 2009 and the number increased to 2,215 
by the end of 2009. This equals 0.13 cameras per square kilometer if equally spaced.6 As of October, 
2010 Beijing had about five thousand police officers to direct traffic.7 
 
 
 
2 As of December 24, 2010 the law was changed to allow multiple citations to be issued per day. 
3 Annual vehicle taxes ranged from RMB 300 to 600 depending on vehicle size according to Beijing 
Local Taxation Bureau Document Nos. 329 (2004) and 339 (2007). 
4 Until December 31, 2008, monthly highway maintenance fees for passenger vehicles were RMB 22 
for each seat of capacity according to the Beijing Highway Bureau (http://www.ylfzhj.bj.cn). For a 
common passenger vehicle with five seats the monthly fees would therefore be RMB 110. After 
December 31, 2008, the fees were absorbed into fuel taxes and not affected by a violation. 
5 According to China Insurance Regulatory Commission Beijing Bureau (http://www.china-
insurance.com/newscenter/newslist.asp?id=132329). 
6 Data taken from Beijing Traffic Management Bureau, accessed at http://www.bjjtgl.gov.cn. Density 
calculation based on Beijing’s land area of 16,411 square kilometers. 
7 According to http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2010/10-11/2579335.shtml. 
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Appendix J 
Detailed Compliance Results 
 
Panel A: Comparison of Expected (Weekend) and Observed (Weekday) Distributions of Ending 
License Plate Numbers Entering Beijing Parking Garage during Restricted Hours (7:00 am - 8:00 pm) 
from June 27 to July 3, 2010 - Regular Parkers 
 
The top panel shows the expected distribution from the two weekend days (June 27 and July 3). The 
second panel shows data for the Monday (June 28) restricted hours, when plate numbers “1” and “6” 
were banned: 
• The first two rows show the observed distribution of plate numbers. 
• The third row tests whether each plate’s proportion during the restricted hours is significantly 
greater than zero using a one-tailed test. Plain text indicates that the proportion is not significantly 
greater than zero (plates “1,” “4,” and “6”) and bold indicates that it is statistically greater than 
zero (all other plates). 
• The fourth row tests whether the observed proportion of each non-restricted plate differs from the 
expected proportion using a two-tailed test. In doing so, we adjust the expected distribution for the 
fact that there should be no “1” and “6” plates (i.e., we compute the expected proportion assuming 
only the presence of the eight other plates). Bold significance levels indicate that the plate appears 
in statistically greater proportion than expected (none), those in bold italics indicate that it appears 
in significantly lower proportion than expected (plates “2” and “3”) and those in plain text that it is 
not significantly different (all others). 
The data for the other weekdays is in the same format. Restricted numbers are shown in boxes. 
 
Distribution 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total No P
Expected Distribution (Weekend)
Number 635 534 594 597 83 593 753 636 743 807 5,975 96
Percentage 10.6% 8.9% 9.9% 10.0% 1.4% 9.9% 12.6% 10.6% 12.4% 13.5% 100.0% 1.6%
Observed Distributions
Monday (1, 6 Restricted)
Number 398 45 312 315 54 380 67 400 486 490 2,947 28
Percentage 13.5% 1.5% 10.6% 10.7% 1.8% 12.9% 2.3% 13.6% 16.5% 16.6% 100.0% 1.0%
Different from Zero (SL)1 0.0% 20.2% 0.0% 0.0% 15.8% 0.0% 10.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Different from Expected (SL)2 54.7% 3.2% 3.7% 67.3% 34.5% 50.8% 14.1% 93.8%
Tuesday (2, 7 Restricted)
Number 357 319 50 325 63 339 436 63 440 456 2,848 26
Percentage 12.5% 11.2% 1.8% 11.4% 2.2% 11.9% 15.3% 2.2% 15.4% 16.0% 100.0% 0.9%
Different from Zero (SL)1 0.0% 0.0% 17.2% 0.0% 11.6% 0.0% 0.0% 11.6% 0.0% 0.0%
Different from Expected (SL)2 34.3% 29.6% 18.8% 4.8% 44.9% 46.7% 31.2% 35.5%
Wednesday (3, 8 Restricted)
Number 353 270 327 31 43 351 453 393 75 447 2,743 29
Percentage 12.9% 9.8% 11.9% 1.1% 1.6% 12.8% 16.5% 14.3% 2.7% 16.3% 100.0% 1.1%
Different from Zero (SL)1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 27.6% 20.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.3% 0.0%
Different from Expected (SL)2 35.4% 4.7% 30.4% 30.7% 26.4% 15.2% 8.2% 30.9%
Thursday (4, 9 Restricted)
Number 382 375 333 369 0 409 492 372 526 79 3,337 29
Percentage 11.4% 11.2% 10.0% 11.1% 0.0% 12.3% 14.7% 11.1% 15.8% 2.4% 100.0% 0.9%
Different from Zero (SL)1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% N/A4 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 8.3%
Different from Expected (SL)2 29.9% 14.9% 3.8% 56.4% 22.1% 71.4% 13.6% 5.7%
Friday (0, 5 Restricted)
Number 69 349 340 373 46 68 402 348 497 533 3,025 39
Percentage 2.3% 11.5% 11.2% 12.3% 1.5% 2.2% 13.3% 11.5% 16.4% 17.6% 100.0% 1.3%
Different from Zero (SL)1 10.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 10.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Different from Expected (SL)2 26.8% 33.8% 66.6% 60.9% 2.2% 8.8% 7.4% 10.5%
Ending license plate numbers of autos entering a Beijing parking garage inside the 4th Ring Road collected by authors. 1 SL = significance level. Bold indicates significantly 
greater than zero (at the 10% level or better) using a one-tailed equality of proportions test. 2 SL = significance level. Bold indicates significantly greater (at the 10% level or 
better) than expected proportion (assuming restricted plates occur in proportion zero) using a two-tailed equality of proportions test and bold, italics significantly lower. 3 No 
observations - significance level is undefined. Boxes indicate restricted plate numbers on that day.
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Panel B: Comparison of Expected (Weekend) and Observed (Weekday) Distributions of Ending 
License Plate Numbers Entering Beijing Parking Garage during Non-Restricted Weekday Hours (9:00 
pm - 6:00 am) from June 27 to July 3, 2010 - Regular Parkers 
 
The top panel shows the expected distribution from the two weekend days (June 27 and July 3). The 
second panel shows data for the Monday (June 28) non-restricted hours: 
• The first two rows show the observed distribution of plate numbers. 
• The third row provides test statistics comparing the observed proportion of each plate to the 
expected based on a two-tailed test. Bold font indicates that the observed proportion is 
significantly greater than expected (none), bold italics lower (none), and plain text not significantly 
different (all plates). 
The data for the other weekdays is in the same format. Numbers restricted during the restricted hours of 
that day are shown in boxes. 
 
Distribution 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total No P
Expected Distribution (Weekend)
Number 635 534 594 597 83 593 753 636 743 807 5,975 96
Percentage 10.6% 8.9% 9.9% 10.0% 1.4% 9.9% 12.6% 10.6% 12.4% 13.5% 100.0% 1.6%
Observed Distributions
Monday (1, 6 Restricted)
Number 7 3 4 2 1 3 7 4 7 4 42
Percentage 16.7% 7.1% 9.5% 4.8% 2.4% 7.1% 16.7% 9.5% 16.7% 9.5% 100.0% 4.8%
Different from Observed (SL)1 20.6% 68.4% 92.8% 25.9% 58.5% 54.8% 42.9% 81.4% 40.8% 45.1%
Tuesday (2, 7 Restricted)
Number 13 9 2 9 1 4 11 6 14 7 76
Percentage 17.1% 11.8% 2.6% 11.8% 1.3% 5.3% 14.5% 7.9% 18.4% 9.2% 100.0% 2.6%
Different from Observed (SL)1 7.0% 37.9% 3.4% 59.3% 95.7% 17.6% 62.6% 43.9% 11.7% 27.5%
Wednesday (3, 8 Restricted)
Number 7 4 2 6 2 5 9 5 5 5 50
Percentage 14.0% 8.0% 4.0% 12.0% 4.0% 10.0% 18.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 100.0% 4.0%
Different from Observed (SL)1 44.2% 81.7% 16.1% 63.7% 11.9% 98.6% 25.3% 88.3% 60.3% 47.0%
Thursday (4, 9 Restricted)
Number 1 2 4 0 0 2 8 1 1 0 19
Percentage 5.3% 10.5% 21.1% 0.0% 0.0% 10.5% 42.1% 5.3% 5.3% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
Different from Observed (SL)1 44.8% 80.9% 10.7% 14.6% 60.5% 93.0% 0.0% 44.7% 34.4% 8.5%
Friday (0, 5 Restricted)
Number 6 9 13 10 3 3 14 9 11 5 83
Percentage 7.2% 10.8% 15.7% 12.0% 3.6% 3.6% 16.9% 10.8% 13.3% 6.0% 100.0% 0.0%
Different from Observed (SL)1 31.7% 54.6% 8.5% 53.5% 8.9% 5.5% 24.6% 95.3% 82.3% 4.7%
Ending license plate numbers of autos entering a Beijing parking garage inside the 4th Ring Road collected by authors.1 SL = significance level. Bold indicates significantly 
greater (at the 10% level or better) than expected proportion using a one-tailed equality of proportions test, bold italics indicates significantly less (at the 10% level or better) than 
expected proportion using a two-tailed equality of proportions test. Boxes indicate restricted plate numbers on that day.
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Panel C: Comparison of Expected (Weekend) and Observed (Weekday) Distributions of Ending 
License Plate Numbers Entering Beijing Parking Garage during Restricted Hours (7:00 am - 8:00 pm) 
from June 27 to July 3, 2010 - Monthly Parkers 
 
The top panel shows the expected distribution from the two weekend days (June 27 and July 3). The 
second panel shows data for the Monday (June 28) restricted hours, when plate numbers “1” and “6” 
were banned: 
• The first two rows show the observed distribution of plate numbers. 
• The third row tests whether each plate’s proportion during the restricted hours is significantly 
greater than zero using a one-tailed test. Plain text indicates that the proportion is not significantly 
greater than zero (plates “1,” “4”, and “6”) and bold indicates that it is statistically greater than 
zero (all other plates). 
• The fourth row tests whether the observed proportion of each non-restricted plate differs from the 
expected proportion using a two-tailed test. In doing so, we adjust the expected distribution for the 
fact that there should be no “1” and “6” plates (i.e., we compute the expected proportion assuming 
only the presence of the eight other plates). Bold significance levels indicate that the plate appears 
in statistically greater proportion than expected (plates “3” and “5”), those in bold italics indicate 
that it appears in significantly lower proportion than expected (plate “8”) and those in plain text 
that it is not significantly different (all others). 
The data for the other weekdays is in the same format. Restricted numbers are shown in boxes. 
 
Distribution 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total No P
Expected Distribution (Weekend)
Number 14 20 15 7 1 9 27 20 29 26 168
Percentage 8.3% 11.9% 8.9% 4.2% 0.6% 5.4% 16.1% 11.9% 17.3% 15.5% 100.0% 1.8%
Observed Distributions
Monday (1, 6 Restricted)
Number 46 3 46 56 6 60 6 60 58 70 411
Percentage 11.2% 0.7% 11.2% 13.6% 1.5% 14.6% 1.5% 14.6% 14.1% 17.0% 100.0% 0.2%
Different from Zero (SL)1 0.8% 44.1% 0.8% 0.1% 38.3% 0.1% 38.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%
Different from Expected (SL)2 96.9% 77.4% 1.6% 57.6% 3.3% 66.7% 1.3% 31.0%
Tuesday (2, 7 Restricted)
Number 26 27 3 21 3 28 36 5 44 42 235 3
Percentage 11.1% 11.5% 1.3% 8.9% 1.3% 11.9% 15.3% 2.1% 18.7% 17.9% 100.0% 1.3%
Different from Zero (SL)1 3.6% 3.1% 42.2% 7.6% 42.2% 2.6% 0.5% 37.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Different from Expected (SL)2 78.7% 39.3% 17.3% 61.9% 9.3% 28.4% 58.1% 80.7%
Wednesday (3, 8 Restricted)
Number 36 29 51 3 3 43 36 49 11 51 312 2
Percentage 11.5% 9.3% 16.3% 1.0% 1.0% 13.8% 11.5% 15.7% 3.5% 16.3% 100.0% 0.6%
Different from Zero (SL)1 1.5% 4.2% 0.1% 43.2% 43.2% 0.4% 1.5% 0.1% 26.3% 0.1%
Different from Expected (SL)2 66.0% 10.3% 12.7% 80.4% 2.6% 2.4% 73.6% 51.9%
Thursday (4, 9 Restricted)
Number 25 23 21 27 0 34 38 26 31 11 236
Percentage 10.6% 9.7% 8.9% 11.4% 0.0% 14.4% 16.1% 11.0% 13.1% 4.7% 100.0% 0.8%
Different from Zero (SL)1 4.3% 5.8% 7.6% 3.1% N/A4 0.8% 0.3% 3.6% 1.5% 23.2%
Different from Expected (SL)2 72.1% 25.2% 68.3% 2.4% 1.2% 58.2% 46.0% 8.8%
Friday (0, 5 Restricted)
Number 1 47 41 54 3 9 66 61 59 66 407
Percentage 0.2% 11.5% 10.1% 13.3% 0.7% 2.2% 16.2% 15.0% 14.5% 16.2% 100.0% 1.0%
Different from Zero (SL)1 48.0% 0.7% 1.6% 0.2% 44.1% 32.6% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%
Different from Expected (SL)2 54.1% 99.5% 0.4% 93.7% 58.5% 65.0% 15.1% 72.0%
Ending license plate numbers of autos entering a Beijing parking garage inside the 4th Ring Road collected by authors. 1 SL = significance level. Bold indicates significantly 
greater than zero (at the 10% level or better) using a one-tailed test. 2 SL = significance level. Bold indicates significantly greater (at the 10% level or better) than expected 
proportion (assuming restricted plates occur in proportion zero) using a two-tailed test and bold, italics significantly lower. 3 No observations - significance level is 
undefined. Boxes indicate restricted plate numbers on that day.
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